Glossary of Philosophical terms pdf

a posteriori definition philosophy and branches of philosophy and their definition
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10-Perry-Gloss.qxd 5/14/12 10:07 PM Page 839 GLOSSARY OF PHILOSOPHICAL TERMS z Some of the bolded words in the text are mere cognates to the words that appear in this glossary, so if you are unable to find the precise word that was bolded in the text, try looking for cognate words. could turn into a cockroach, so having a human absolutism The view that there are some types of body isn’t one of his essential properties. Some action that are strictly prohibited by morality, no philosophers argue that the metaphysical idea matter what the specific facts are in a particular that underlies the accidental–essential distinction case. Some have held, for example, that the inten- is wrong. Things belong to many kinds, which tional torturing or killing of an innocent person is are more or less important for various classifica- morally impermissible no matter what bad con- tory purposes, but there is no kind that is more sequences could be prevented by such an action. fundamental than all others apart from such pur- Absolutism is an especially strict kind of deonto- poses. Quine, a leading skeptic, gives the example logical view. It is discussed by Thomas Nagel in of a bicyclist: If Fred is a bicyclist, is he necessar- “War and Massacre.” ily two-legged? accidental and essential A property is essential for an object if the object must have the property to affirming the consequent Affirming the conse- exist and be the kind of thing that it is. A property quent is the logical fallacy committed by argu- is accidental if the object has the property, but ments of the following form: doesn’t have to have it to exist or be the kind of thing that it is. If P, then Q. Suppose Fred has short hair. That is an acci- Q. dental property of his. He would still be Fred, Therefore, P. and still be a human being, if he let his hair grow long or shaved it off completely. An essential This is an invalid argument form. Consider property is one that a thing has to have to be the this argument, which affirms the consequent: thing that it is, or to be the kind of thing it fun- damentally is. As a human being, Fred wouldn’t If Jones is 20 years old, then Jones is exist unless he had a human body, so having a younger than 50 years old. human body is an essential property of his. Jones is younger than 50 years old. Statements about which properties are essen- Therefore, Jones is 20 years old. tial tend to be controversial. A dualist might dis- agree about our last example, arguing that Fred is Clearly, this argument is a bad one: Jones fundamentally a mind that might exist without could be any age younger than 50. any body at all, so having a body isn’t one of his When someone affirms the consequent, often essential properties. Someone who has been read- he or she is mistaking his or her inference as a ing Kafka’s Metamorphoses might argue that Fred harmless instance of modus ponens. . . 83910-Perry-Gloss.qxd 5/14/12 10:07 PM Page 840 840 GLOSSARY agent-causation Agent-causation is a (putative) from analogy needs to defend the relevance of the type of causation that can best be understood by known analogies to the argued for analogies. contrasting it with event-causation. When a ball analytic and synthetic Analytic statements are hits and breaks a window, one may think of the those that are true (or false) in virtue of the way causal relationship here in terms of one event the ideas or meanings in them fit together. A causing another, namely, the ball’s hitting the win- standard example is “No bachelor is married.” dow causing the window’s being broken. In an in- This is true simply in virtue of the meanings of stance of agent causation, it is not one event that the words. “No bachelor is happy,” on the other causes another. Rather, an agent—a persisting hand, is synthetic. It isn’t true or false just in substance—causes an event. Some philosophers, virtue of the meanings of the words. It is true or such as Roderick Chisholm (see Chisholm, false in virtue of the experiences of bachelors, and “Human Freedom and the Self”) have argued these can’t be determined just by thinking about that agent-causation is required for genuine free the meanings of the words. will. Agent-causation is also (see Chisholm) The analytic/synthetic distinction is closely re- sometimes referred to as immanent causation, and lated to the necessary–contingent distinction and event causation sometimes referred to as transe- the a priori–a posteriori distinction; indeed, these unt causation. three distinctions are often confused with one an- ampliative/nonampliative inference See deductive other. But they are not the same. The last one has argument. to do with knowledge, the middle one with pos- sibility, and the first one with meaning. Although analogy An analogy is a similarity between things. some philosophers think that the three distinc- In an argument from analogy, one argues from tions amount to the same thing, others do not. known similarities to further similarities. Such Kant maintains that truths of arithmetic are a arguments often occur in philosophy. In his Dia- priori and necessary but not analytic. Kripke logues Concerning Natural Religion, David Hume maintains that some identity statements are nec- considers an argument from analogy that pur- essary, but not analytic or a priori. ports to show that the universe was created by an intelligent being. The character Cleanthes claims analytical philosophy The term analytical philoso- that the world as a whole is similar to things like phy is often used for a style of doing philosophy clocks. A clock has a variety of interrelated parts that was dominant throughout most of the twen- that function together in ways that serve ends. tieth century in Great Britain, North America, The world is also a complex of interrelated parts Australia, and New Zealand. This way of doing that function in ways that serve ends, such as pro- philosophy puts great emphasis on clarity, and it viding food for human consumption. Clocks are usually sees philosophy as a matter of clarifying the result of intelligent design, so, Cleanthes con- important concepts in the sciences, the humani- cludes, probably the world as a whole is also the ties, politics, and everyday life, rather than pro- product of intelligent design. Hume’s character viding an independent source of knowledge. Philo criticizes the argument. In “The Argument Analytical philosophy is often contrasted with from Analogy for Other Minds,” Bertrand Rus- continental philosophy, the sort of philosophy that sell uses an argument from analogy to try to jus- has been more dominant in France, Germany, tify his belief that other conscious beings exist. Spain, Italy, and some other European countries. Arguments from analogy are seldom airtight. The term was first associated with the move- It is possible for things to be very similar in some ment initiated by Bertrand Russell and G. E. respects, but quite different in others. A loaf of Moore early in the twentieth century to reject the bread might be about the same size and shape as a idealistic philosophy of F. H. Bradley, which had rock. But it differs considerably in weight, texture, been influenced by the German idealism of Hegel taste, and nutritive value. A successful argument and others. Moore saw philosophy as the analysis10-Perry-Gloss.qxd 5/14/12 10:07 PM Page 841 GLOSSARY 841 of concepts. Analytical philosophy grew out of the side. One couldn’t figure out whether it was rain- approach and concerns of Moore and Russell, ing or not by just reasoning about it. Now con- combined with the logical positivist movement sider the following questions: (1) Are there any and certain elements of pragmatism in America. married bachelors? (2) What is the sum of 38 and However, the term analytical philosophy now 27? After a bit of thought, you should conclude refers to many philosophers who do not subscribe that there are no married bachelors, and 38 + 27 to the exact conceptions of philosophy held by the = 65. You know these things a priori. You didn’t analysts, logical positivists, or pragmatists. need to make any observations about what was Indeed, there are really no precise conceptual happening. You just needed to reason. or geographic boundaries separating analytical One important question about a priori truths and continental philosophy. There are many is whether they are all analytic, or whether there analytical philosophers on the continent of are some synthetic a priori truths. The philoso- Europe and many who identify themselves pher Kant thought that (1) above was a priori and with continental philosophy in English-speaking analytic, whereas (2) was a priori and synthetic. countries. And there are important subgroups See analytic and synthetic for further discussion. within each group. Within analytical philosophy, An a priori argument is one that uses no empir- some philosophers take logic as their model, and ical premises. An a priori concept is one that is in- others emphasize ordinary language. Both ana- nate or could be acquired just by using one’s lytical and continental philosophers draw inspi- reason. ration from the great philosophers of history, See also analytic and synthetic; contingent from the pre-Socratics, Plato, and Aristotle to and necessary; matters of fact and relations of Hume, Kant, Hegel, Marx, Mill, Frege, Husserl, ideas. James, and Dewey. a priori See a posteriori and a priori. antecedent See conditionals. argument from analogy See analogy. anthropomorphism Anthropomorphism is the asymmetric attitudes To say that our attitudes to- practice of ascribing to nonhuman beings proper- ward two things are asymmetrical is simply to say ties and characteristics of human beings. In phi- that they are different. The asymmetric attitudes losophy of religion, there is a general concern arise as a particular puzzle when the things to- whether and to what extent our thought about ward which we hold asymmetric attitudes are ap- God is problematically anthropomorphic. For in- parently the same in relevant ways. stance, it is commonly held that depictions of A prime example of this is the asymmetric at- God as having a body are mere anthropomor- titudes we hold toward the time before birth and phisms. But what about depictions of God as be- the time after death. Both are long periods of time coming angry or frustrated? Whether such in which we do not exist. It would seem, then, that depictions ought to be taken literally or treated as our attitudes toward them should be symmetric. merely anthropomorphic is a matter of some con- Intuitively, though, it seems reasonable to regard troversy. death as a bad thing, and unreasonable to regard the period of prenatal nonexistence as comparably a posteriori and a priori A posteriori knowledge is bad. That is, we hold asymmetric attitudes to- based on experience, on observation of how ward death and prenatal nonexistence. things are in the world of changing things. A pri- ori knowledge is based on reasoning rather than atheism Atheism is disbelief in a god. Strictly observation. speaking, atheists are those who don’t believe in Your knowledge that it is raining outside is a any god or gods, but often writers will describe posteriori knowledge. It is based on your experi- someone who does not believe in the god or gods ence, your observation of what is happening out- in which they believe as an atheist.10-Perry-Gloss.qxd 5/14/12 10:07 PM Page 842 842 GLOSSARY basic structure In “A Theory of Justice,” John At the end of the tour he says, “This is all very well, Rawls says that his theory of justice concerns a so- but what I’d like to see is the university.” Your ciety’s major social, political, and economic insti- friend would here be making a category-mistake. tutions. His examples include the existence of He apparently thinks that the university is yet an- competitive markets, basic political liberties, and other building in addition to the library, and so on, the structure of the family. Rawls calls this the whereas in reality it is more like the sum total of basic structure of a society. G. A. Cohen, in such buildings and their relationships. “Where the Action Is,” argues that there is an im- causal determinism See determinism. portant ambiguity in this idea. cause and effect We think of the world as more than behaviorism Behaviorism is used in somewhat dif- just things happening; the things that happen are ferent senses in psychology and philosophy. In connected to one another, and what happens later psychology, behaviorism was a twentieth-century depends on what happens earlier. We suppose that movement that maintained that the study of be- some things cause others, their effects. The notion havior is the best or even the only way to study of cause connects with other important notions, mental phenomena scientifically. It is opposed to such as responsibility. We blame people for the the introspective methods for the study of the harm they cause, not for things that just happened mind emphasized in much psychology of the when they were in the vicinity. We assume that nineteenth century. This is methodological behav- there is a cause when things go wrong—when iorism. A methodological behaviorist might even airliners crash, or the climate changes, or the elec- believe in an immaterial mind (see dualism), but tricity goes off—and we search for an explanation maintain nevertheless that there was no scientific that discloses the cause or causes. way to study the immaterial mind except Causation is intuitively a relation of depend- through its effects on observable, bodily behavior. ence between events. The event that is caused, the In philosophy, however, behaviorism opposes effect, depends for its occurrence on the cause. It dualism; the term means some form of the view wouldn’t have happened without it. The occur- that the mind is nothing above and beyond be- rence of the cause explains the effect. Once we see havior. Logical behaviorists maintain that talk that the cause happened, we understand why the about the mind can be reduced without remain- effect did. der to talk about behavior. Criteriological behav- Most philosophers agree that causal connec- iorists maintain that mental terms may not be tions are contingent rather than necessary. Suppose completely reducible to behavioral terms, but the blowout caused the accident. Still, it was pos- they can only be given meaning through ties to sible for the blowout to happen and the accident behavioral criteria. not to occur. After all, the world might have Behaviorism is closely related to functionalism. worked in such a way that a blowout was fol- British Empiricism See empiricism. lowed not by an accident but by the car’s gradu- ally slowing to a halt. Cartesian dualism See dualism. On one common view, however, causation im- category-mistake According to Gilbert Ryle (see plies laws of nature in the sense that causal con- “Descartes’s Myth”) a category-mistake is commit- nections are instances of such laws. So causal ted (roughly) when one thinks of or represents relations are “relatively necessary”: they are con- things of a certain kind as being or belonging to a tingent only insofar as the laws of nature are con- category or logical type to which they do not be- tingent. It may be a contingent fact that the laws long. Ryle’s examples illustrate this sort of mistake of physics are what they are. But, on this view, nicely. Suppose someone visits your university, and given the contingent fact that the laws of nature you take him on a tour of the campus, showing are as they are, the accident had to happen once him the student commons, the library, and so on. the blowout did.10-Perry-Gloss.qxd 5/14/12 10:07 PM Page 843 GLOSSARY 843 Hume holds such a view. He claims that, at feeling of the mind passing from perception to least as far as humans can comprehend things, A expectation, to identify what else there is. causing B amounts, at bottom, to the fact that commodification We treat some goods as subject events like A are always followed by events like B. to norms of a market: They can be bought and Causation requires universal succession. (Such sold for prices that are subject to pressures of sup- universal succession is sometimes called custom- ply and demand. This is how we see, for example, ary or constant conjunction.) At first this doesn’t cars and computers: We treat cars and computers seem very plausible. After all, many blowouts as commodities. Are there moral limits to such don’t lead to accidents. It seems more plausible if commodification—moral limits to the appropri- we assume that Hume is thinking of the total ate scope of markets? If so, what are they and cause, the blowout plus all the other relevant fac- what is their justification? These are questions tors that in this case led to the accident, including Debra Satz explores in her “Markets in Women’s the design of the car and the skill of the driver. Reproductive Labor.” Taken this way, the universal succession analysis implies that if the blowout caused the accident, compatibilism and incompatibilism In philoso- then if all of these relevant conditions were du- phy, the term compatibilism usually refers to a po- plicated in another case, and there is a blowout, sition in the issue of freedom versus determinism. an accident would happen. If not, and if the Intuitively it seems that freedom excludes deter- blowout really caused the accident in the original minism, and vice versa. But this has been denied case, there must be some relevant difference. by some philosophers; they claim that acts can be This version of universal succession seems more both free and determined, usually adding that the plausible, but perhaps not totally convincing. traditional problem is the product of confused Even if we grant the Humean relevant differ- thinking abetted by too little attention to the ence principle, there are difficulties with the idea meaning of words. that causation simply is universal succession. Hume held this position. In Section VIII of his Consider what it means about the case of the An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, he blowout causing the accident. What is the real describes his project as one of “reconciling” lib- connection, according to the universal succession erty with necessity, these being his terms for free- theory, between this particular blowout and this dom and determinism. Hume said that liberty particular accident? It just seems to be that the consists of acting according to the determinations blowout occurred, and then the accident oc- of your will; that is, doing as you decide to do. A curred. That’s all there really is to causation, as it free act is not one that is uncaused, but one that is pertains to these two events. All the rest that is re- caused by the wants, desires, and decisions of the quired, on the universal succession analysis, has person who performs it. Hence an act can be both to do with other events—events like the blowout free and an instance of a universal causal princi- and events like the accident. It seems that there is ple. On this conception, an unfree act is one that more to causation than this. one must do in spite of one’s own desires and de- Hume offers a candidate for this additional cisions, rather than because of them. something involved in causation. He says it is re- Some compatibilists go further and maintain ally just a certain feeling we have when we have that freedom requires determinism. The idea is experienced many cases of events of one type that for our own will to determine what we do, being followed by events of another. When we our decisions must cause our actions, and causa- have had this experience, our minds pass from tion in turn requires determinism. the perception of an event of the first kind to an Given this distinction, the views of most expectation of one of the second kind. Hume philosophers on the issue of freedom and deter- challenges us, if we are not satisfied that causa- minism can be located among the following pos- tion is just universal succession together with the sible positions:10-Perry-Gloss.qxd 5/14/12 10:07 PM Page 844 844 GLOSSARY 1. Incompatibilism: Freedom and determin- Conditionals can be in various tenses and in ism are incompatible. This view leaves the indicative or subjunctive: open two main theoretical options: Indicative: If Susan comes to the party, then a. Libertarianism: There are some free acts, Michael brings the salad. If Susan came to the party, so determinism is false. then Michael brought the salad. If Susan will come to b. Hard determinism: Determinism is true, the party, Michael will bring the salad. so there are no free acts. Subjunctive: If Susan were to come to the party, 2. Compatibilism: Freedom and determinism Michael would bring the salad. If Susan had come to are compatible. This view is typically part the party, Michael would have brought the salad. of a view called soft determinism, according to which there are free acts and determin- A counterfactual conditional, one in which the ism is also true. This view in turn comes in antecedent is false, will usually be in the sub- two varieties: junctive if the speaker realizes that the an- a. There are free acts. Determinism is as a tecedent is false. matter of fact true, but there would be One thing seems quite clear about condition- free acts whether or not determinism als: If the antecedent is true, and the consequent were true. false, then the conditional as a whole is false. If b. There are free acts. Determinism is true Susan comes to the party, and Michael doesn’t and its truth is required for freedom. bring the salad, then all of the examples preced- 3. Freedom is incoherent: Freedom both re- ing are false. This is the basis for two clearly valid quires and is incompatible with determin- rules of inference: ism, and hence makes no sense. Modus ponens: From If P, then Q and P, infer Q. Some philosophers distinguish between free- Modus tollens: From If P, then Q and not-Q, dom of action and free will. Free will involves infer not-P. more than having one’s actions determined by In symbolic logic a defined symbol (often “R”) is one’s decisions and desires. It involves having called the conditional. The conditions under which control over those desires and decisions them- conditional statements that involve this symbol are selves. Someone might have freedom, as the com- true are stipulated by logicians as follows: patibilist understands it, without having free will. For example, a person addicted to smoking 1. Antecedent true, consequent true, condi- might be free in the sense that whether or not he tional true or she smokes on a given occasion is determined 2. Antecedent true, consequent false, condi- by personal desire. But what if this person doesn’t tional false want to have or be controlled by that desire? 3. Antecedent false, consequent true, condi- Does he or she have the power to get rid of the de- tional true sire, or weaken its hold? This is the question of 4. Antecedent false, consequent false, condi- free will. The issue of whether free will is com- tional true patible or incompatible with determinism can then be raised. This defined symbol, then, agrees with the or- dinary language conditional on the clear case, conclusion See deductive argument. number 2, the case that is crucial for the validity conditionals A conditional is a kind of statement of modus ponens and modus tollens. But what that is made out of two others. The normal form about the other cases? Suppose Susan doesn’t of the statements is “If P then Q.” P is the an- come to the party, but Michael brings that salad tecedent and Q the consequent. “If P, Q” and “Q, if (antecedent false, consequent true). The symbolic P” are stylistic variations of “If P then Q.” logic statement,10-Perry-Gloss.qxd 5/14/12 10:07 PM Page 845 GLOSSARY 845 Susan comes to the party turned out differently. If he had gotten a later Michael brings the start, he might not have reached America until salad 1493. So the fact that he arrived in 1492 is contin- gent. Necessary facts are those that could not is true in this case, because of part 3 of the defi- have failed to be facts. The year 1492 would have nition. It isn’t so clear that the ordinary language occurred before the year 1493 no matter how long conditionals are true. Suppose that Michael says, it took Columbus to get his act together. It is a “I brought the salad because Susan couldn’t make necessary fact. Mathematical facts are a particu- it. If she had come, she would have brought it.” Are larly clear example of necessary facts. The fact any or all of the ordinary language conditionals that 2 + 2 = 4 doesn’t depend on one thing hap- listed true in this case? False? What of Michael’s pening rather than another. second sentence, which is also a conditional? Philosophers sometimes use the idea of a See necessary and sufficient conditions. possible world to explain this distinction. Neces- sary truths are true in every possible world. consequent See conditionals. Contingent truths are true in the actual world but false in some other possible worlds. Necessary consequentialism Consequentialism is a view about falsehoods are false in the actual world and false what makes it right or wrong to do something. It in every other possible world, too. If one thinks of maintains that the rightness of an action is deter- the distinction this way, one must be careful to mined by the goodness or badness of relevant distinguish between the truth of a sentence and consequences. Utilitarianism is a consequentialist the truth of what it says. It is easy to imagine a theory that holds that what makes consequences possible world in which the sentence “2 + 2 = 4” better or worse is, at bottom, the welfare or hap- is false. Just imagine that the numeral “2” stood piness of sentient beings. A deontological ethics for the number three, but “4” still stands for four. rejects consequentialism and holds that the right- But imagining the sentence to have a meaning ness of action depends at least in part on things that makes it false is not the same as imagining other than the goodness of relevant conse- what it says, given its actual meaning, to be false. quences. For example, someone who rejects con- It is the latter that is important when we ask if it sequentialism might hold that the principle is necessary or contingent that 2 + 2 = 4. under which an act is done determines whether it The distinction between the necessary and is right or wrong. Kant held a version of this contingent is a metaphysical distinction. It has to view; see the Introduction to Part V. do with facts or propositions and truth. It is constitutive luck Constitutive luck is one of the closely related to the epistemological distinction four types of moral luck identified by Thomas between a priori and a posteriori and the distinc- Nagel. One is subject to constitutive luck insofar tion between analytic and synthetic statements. as the sort of person that one is (one’s character, These three similar distinctions shouldn’t be con- personality, etc.) is beyond one’s control and yet fused. Some philosophers claim that they are co- the person is still seen as an apt candidate for extensional. But they are not cointensional, so this praise and blame. See also moral luck. is a substantive philosophical claim. For example, some philosophers claim that there are mathe- continental philosophy See analytical philosophy. matical facts that have nothing to do with the continental rationalism See rationalism. meanings of words, and may never be known at contingent and necessary Some things are facts, all, and are hence not knowable a priori, but are but would not have been facts if things had hap- still necessary. pened differently. These are contingent facts. corroboration See deductivism. Consider, for example, the fact that Columbus reached America in 1492. Things could have cosmogony See cosmos.10-Perry-Gloss.qxd 5/14/12 10:07 PM Page 846 846 GLOSSARY cosmological argument See cosmos. not contain anything not already found in the premises. In other words, the conclusion is sim- cosmology See cosmos. ply “drawn out of” the premises. They are thus necessarily truth preserving: If the premises are cosmos The cosmos is the universe considered as true, the conclusion (because, logically, it says no an integrated orderly system. Sometimes the cos- more than the premises) must also be true. De- mos is the orderly part of a larger whole, the ductive logic provides rules of inference that ex- other part being chaos. Any account of the origin hibit valid patterns of reasoning. of the universe as a whole, whether based on An argument can provide those who believe myth, religion, philosophy, or science is a cos- its premises good reason for accepting its conclu- mogony. An account of the nature and origin of sion even if it is not valid. Among arguments that the universe that is systematic is a cosmology. This are not valid, we can distinguish between those term is used for the particular branch of physics that are strong and weak. A strong nondemon- that considers this question, and also for inquiries strative or nondeductive argument makes the of a more philosophical nature. Cosmological ar- truth of the conclusion very probable. Analogical guments for the existence of God begin with very arguments, for example, are nondeductive but can general facts about the known universe, such as be quite strong. causation, movement, and contingency, and then argue that God must exist, as first cause, or un- Inductive arguments involve generalizing moved mover, or necessary being, to account for from instances. Having noticed that a certain these facts. The first two ways of proving the ex- radio station plays rock music on a number of oc- istence of God listed by St. Thomas Aquinas are casions, you may infer that it always does so, or cosmological arguments. that it is at least very likely that it will do so next time you tune in. This process is called induction customary/constant conjunction See cause and by enumeration. Inductive arguments are amplia- effect. tive in character: The conclusion of these argu- death The end of life; the cessation of the biologi- ments “goes beyond” what is contained in the cal functioning of the body. All known living premises. Such inferences are not valid, but it things eventually die. seems that they can be quite strong and in fact the whole idea of using past experiences to guide deductive argument Arguments have premises our conduct depends on them. See induction, and a conclusion. The truth of the premises problem of. should provide grounds for the truth of the con- clusion, so that the argument gives one who be- deductivism Deductivism is the thesis that science lieves the premises a good reason for believing the should focus solely on deductive arguments rather conclusion. than inductive arguments because there is no good In a valid argument, the truth of the premises response to the problem of induction. Deductivism is entails the truth of the conclusion. This means most closely associated with the twentieth-century that it is impossible for the premises to be true philosopher of sc\ience Karl Popper. Popper advo- and the conclusion false. A valid argument may cated the hypothetico-deductive model of science, have a false conclusion because the validity of an which held that science should make falsifiable hy- argument does not imply the truth of the prem- potheses about the world and then test them. Hy- ises. If the premises of a valid argument are true, potheses that are not falsified despite severe tests then the argument is sound. Clearly the conclu- are corroborated (although not confirmed). Accord- sion of any sound argument will be true. ing to this model of science, the difference between An argument that aims at validity is deductive, scientific and (say) metaphysical claims is that scien- or demonstrative. Such arguments are nonamplia- tific claims are falsifiable. For discussion, see tive in the following sense: The conclusion does Salmon, “The Problem of Induction.”10-Perry-Gloss.qxd 5/14/12 10:07 PM Page 847 GLOSSARY 847 demonstrative/nondemonstrative inference See de- is the intended effect of your act, and waking ductive argument. your brother is merely foreseen. According to the doctrine (or principle) of dou- deontological ethics See consequentialism. ble effect, the moral status of intended effects dif- deontology Deontology is the study of ethical con- fers from those that are merely foreseen. This cepts having to do with permissibility and imper- principle is sometimes appealed to as a part of a de- missibility, e.g., rights, duties, and obligations. See ontological moral theory. According to this princi- deontological ethics. ple, it might be wrong to swat the fly with the intention of waking up your brother, but permis- determinism Determinism is the doctrine that sible to swat the fly with the intention of killing it, every event, including every intentional action of a knowing it would wake up your brother. A more human being, is determined by prior causes. This interesting example is abortion. Some people is usually thought to imply that there are universal, maintain that it is wrong to act with the intention nonstatistical laws of nature covering every aspect of aborting a fetus, but that nevertheless certain of everything that happens. See cause and effect. operations may be permissible, even though abor- Given the state of the universe at any time, these tion of the fetus is a foreseeable result, so long as laws determine everything else that will ever hap- they are done for some other purpose, such as pre- pen. Some philosophers oppose determinism, be- venting the injury to a mother that continued cause they think that the ultimate laws of nature pregnancy might involve. Some philosophers are statistical. Others oppose it because they maintain the distinction makes no sense. Others believe there are free actions, and that no actions believe there is a coherent distinction between in- can be both free and determined. See freedom, tended and merely expected consequences, but compatibilism and incompatibilism, fatalism. doubt that it has the moral significance it is given difference principle A central idea of John Rawls’s by the doctrine of double effect. theory of justice, referred to as the difference prin- ciple, is that inequalities in the distribution of doxastic/doxically Doxastic states are states having relevant goods are just if and only if these in- to do with beliefs. If I have the belief that p, I am equalities are needed to improve the plight of in the doxastic state of believing that p. A consid- everyone, in particular of those who are the worst eration is doxically relevant if it is relevant to one’s off. (See Rawls’s second principle of justice, “A beliefs. Theory of Justice,” p. 578, and G. A. Cohen’s for- dualism The term dualism has a number of uses in mulation, “Where the Action Is,” p. 599.) philosophy, but perhaps the most common is to distributive justice See justice. describe positions on the mind-body problem double effect, doctrine of An act typically has both that hold that the mind cannot be identified with intended and unintended effects. For example, the body or part of the body, or that mental prop- swatting a fly may have the intended effect erties are not physical properties. of killing a fly, and the unintended effects of The form of dualism Descartes advocated is making a noise and waking up your brother. The called Cartesian dualism or interactive dualism. latter effect may be unintended even though it is The mind is that which is responsible for mental foreseen. You knew that swatting the fly would states of all kinds, including sensation, percep- or at least might wake your brother. That’s not tion, thought, emotion, deliberation, decision, why you were doing it; you were doing it to get and intentional action. Some philosophers main- rid of the fly. Perhaps you didn’t much care tain that this role is played by the brain, but whether or not your brother slept. Perhaps you Descartes argued that this could not be so. His hated to wake him, but it was very important to view was that the mind was a separate thing, or you to swat the fly. In these cases, swatting the fly substance, that causally interacted with the brain,10-Perry-Gloss.qxd 5/14/12 10:07 PM Page 848 848 GLOSSARY and through it with the rest of the body and the human beings ought to pursue their own self- rest of the world. Sensation and perception in- interest. On another usage, it refers simply to the volve states of the world affecting states of sense view that human beings do (perhaps exclusively) organs, which in turn affect the brain, which pursue their own self-interest. causes the mind to be in certain states. Action in- eliminative materialism See materialism and volves states of mind affecting the brain, which in physicalism. turn affects the body, which may interact with other things in the world. embodiment An embodied thing has taken physi- Other forms of dualism include epiphenome- cal, tangible form. That which has been embodied nalism, parallelism, and property dualism. The has, literally, been put into a body. Embodiment epiphenomenalist holds that the body affects the can mean either the process of taking form in this mind, but not vice versa. The mind only appears way, or the state of having been embodied. to affect the body, because the apparent mental Philosophers are most concerned with the em- causes of bodily changes (like the decision to lift bodiment of consciousness, that is, with the way in my arm) coincide with the true bodily causes which thinking, conscious things inhabit physical (some change in my brain). Parallelists hold that forms, and how a conscious being relates to its mind and body are two substances that do not embodiment. interact at all. Property dualism maintains that empiricism Empiricism is an epistemological posi- the mind can be identified with the brain (or with tion that emphasizes the importance of experi- the body as a whole), but mental properties cannot ence and denies or is very skeptical of claims to a be reduced to physical ones. On this view, it is my priori knowledge or concepts. The empirical tra- brain that is responsible for sensation, perception, dition in seventeenth-, eighteenth-, and nine- and other mental phenomena. But the fact that teenth-century philosophy was centered in my brain is thinking a certain thought, for exam- Britain, and Bacon, Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and ple, is an additional fact about it, one that cannot Mill are often referred to as British Empiricists. See be reduced to any of its physical properties. also rationalism. effect See cause and effect. endurance See perdurance and endurance. efficient causation Efficient causation is one of the en-soi According to the existentialist philosopher four types of causation that Aristotle distin- Jean-Paul Sartre, the world is divided between guished. Of these four types, efficient causation is two sorts of beings: beings-in-themselves (en-soi) the sort of causation that best fits contemporary and beings-for-themselves (pour-soi). Beings-in- usage of the word causation. The efficient cause themselves are inanimate things like rocks, of an event is (roughly) the agent or event that whereas beings-for-themselves are beings that brings the effect about. If a ball breaks a window, exhibit feeling and agency. the efficient cause of this event is roughly the entails See deductive argument. ball’s hitting the window. If Jones raises his hand, the efficient cause of this event is, according epiphenomenalism See dualism. to some, Jones himself. When (as in this last example) an agent is supposed to be the efficient epistemology Epistemology is the theory of knowl- cause of some event, this is a (putative) instance of edge, the inquiry into its possibility, nature, and agent-causation (see agent-causation). For another structure. type of causation distinguished by Aristotle, see ergon This is the Greek word for function, which final causation. is a concept that plays an important role in Aris- egoism Egoism has many usages in philosophical totle’s moral theory. For Aristotle, the ergon of discourse. On one usage, it refers to the view that an object is more than just what we may use that10-Perry-Gloss.qxd 5/14/12 10:07 PM Page 849 GLOSSARY 849 object for—rather, it is whatever activity makes saying that pious actions are those actions that that object the sort of thing that it is. For exam- the gods love, Socrates responds by asking ple, although we can use a knife to hammer a whether the gods love pious actions because they nail into a wall if we wish, this is not the knife’s are pious or whether pious actions are pious ergon. Rather, a knife’s ergon is to cut. For dis- because the gods love them. This is a dilemma cussion, see Thomas Nagel’s “Aristotle on Eu- because either response is to some degree unsat- daimonia.” isfactory. If Euthyphro says that the gods love pious actions because they are pious, then this error theory Some philosophical views have the seems to imply that there is something out of the implication that we regularly but unknowingly control of the gods—namely what actions count fall into error when we make claims about some as pious. But, on the other hand, if we say that particular domain of inquiry. For instance, it is a pious actions are pious because the gods love consequence of J. L. Mackie’s view in “The Sub- them, then presumably the gods could have jectivity of Values” that although we regularly loved morally despicable actions, in which case think that at least some of our moral judgments it would follow that some morally despicable ac- are true, they are in fact systematically false. tions would be pious. Mackie thus provides an error theory about More recently, the term Euthyphro dilemma moral judgments. As Mackie points out, such has come to refer to the structurally parallel prob- theories require strong support because of the lem about moral rightness and wrongness, rather challenge they pose to common sense. than piety. For example, are wrong actions wrong because God forbids them or does God essential See accidental and essential. forbid them because they are wrong? In general, eternalism and presentism Of course dinosaurs the dilemma demands an order of explanation— don’t exist right now, but do they just plain is an action’s being wrong explained by its being exist? Again, of course my great-great-grandson forbidden, or is God’s act of forbidding the action doesn’t exist at this moment, but does he exist nev- explained by the action’s being wrong?—and so ertheless? According to eternalism, which is a any order of explanation dilemma, whether view about past and future objects, the answer to about God or not, may be considered a version of these questions is “Yes.” Just as The Eiffel Tower the Euthyphro dilemma. exists even though it doesn’t exist over here, so event-causation See agent-causation. dinosaurs exist even though they don’t exist right now. This view is often contrasted with a view evil, problem of Many philosophers have thought called presentism, according to which the only ob- that the existence of evil poses a problem for jects that exist are those that exist right now. Ac- those who believe that there is a perfect God. A cording to presentism, when dinosaurs went perfect God, it seems, would be able to do any- extinct, they didn’t just cease to exist from then thing (omnipotence), would know everything on—rather, they ceased to exist altogether. (omniscience), and would have all the moral virtues, such as benevolence. If such a God cre- eudaimonia Eudaimonia—sometimes translated ated the world, why is there any evil? Does God “happiness” or “flourishing”—is a central con- not care if we suffer? Then God is not benevo- cept in Aristotle’s ethics. See “Aristotelian Ethics” lent. Is this world the best God could make? in Part V. Then God is not omnipotent. Or perhaps God Euthyphro dilemma The original Euthyphro wanted to do better, and had the power, but did- dilemma is found in one of Plato’s dialogues in n’t quite know what to do. Then God is not which Socrates is questioning an Athenian ominscient. A perfect God would have made the named Euthyphro about the nature of piety. best of all possible worlds. So, the argument When Euthyphro attempts to explain piety by goes, the existence of our imperfect world, full10-Perry-Gloss.qxd 5/14/12 10:07 PM Page 850 850 GLOSSARY of sin and suffering, shows that God does not co-extensional without being co-intensional. Rus- exist, or is not perfect. sell’s example is “human being” and “featherless The problem of evil is pressed by Philo, a main biped that is not a plucked chicken.” These terms character in Hume’s Dialogues on Natural Reli- are not co-intensional, as the property of being a gion. Both Philo and his main adversary, Clean- human being is not the same as the property of thes, give up the idea that God is perfect. Philo being a featherless biped that is not a plucked concludes that while the world was probably cre- chicken. But they are co-extensional. If you set aside ated by an intelligent being or beings, there is no the plucked chickens, humans are the only bipeds reason to attribute benevolence to that being or without feathers. (Probably their extensions are those beings. Cleanthes allows that God may be not quite the same; after all there are plucked only finitely powerful. turkeys, too, but Russell thought the example was Other philosophers have thought, however, close enough to being correct to make the point.) that our problems with evil simply show how dif- The term extension is often used in an extended ficult it is for finite beings to grasp the plan of an sense in which names and sentences have exten- infinitely perfect being. This is, contrary to first sions as well as terms or predicates. (The terminol- impressions, the best of all possible worlds. This ogy is due to Rudolf Carnap, and the idea it is Leibniz’s position in “God, Evil and the Best of incorporates goes back to Gottlob Frege.) The ex- All Possible Worlds.” tension of a name is the thing it names, the exten- sion of a sentence is its truth value, true or false. experiential blank The complete absence of expe- This brings out the systematic connection among rience. This is to be distinguished from the sort of name, predicate, and sentence. The sentence “Fido ‘experience of nothing’ that results from sensory is barking” will have the extension True (i.e., be deprivation. An experiential blank is a complete ab- true), just in case the extension of “Fido” (i.e., sence of consciousness and awareness. It is typically Fido) is a member of the extension of “is barking.” assumed (in secular discussions) that both the time That is, the extension of the parts (the name before our birth (or, perhaps better, conception) and “Fido” and the predicate “is barking”) determines the time after our death are experiential blanks. the extension of the whole sentence. Sentences like this, their truth-value being determined by the ex- extension (alternate) Things that occupy space tension of their parts, are extensional. have extension. Some things that (apparently) If a sentence is extensional, substitution of a exist lack extension including numbers, proper- name in it for another co-extensional name (or a ties, and—according to dualism—minds or souls. predicate for another co-extensional predicate) This usage of extension should be distinguished won’t affect the truth value. Suppose Fido is also from the usage that concerns the application of called “Bad-breath.” Then the substitution of predicates; see extension and intension. “Bad-breath” for “Fido” will preserve the truth extension and intension Consider a predicate like value of our sentence. If “Fido is barking” is true, “human being.” It applies to or is true of a num- so too will be “Bad-breath is barking.” ber of individuals, those who are human beings. Not all sentences are extensional. Consider the The set of these individuals is the extension of true sentence “Bad-breath is so called because of the predicate. The members of this set have the his smell.” If we substitute the co-extensional property of being a human being in common. name “Fido” for “Bad-breath” the result is “Fido This property (or, for some philosophers, the is so called because of his smell.” This sentence concept of this property) is the intension of the isn’t true. So our original sentence, “Bad-breath is predicate. so called because of his smell,” isn’t extensional, Terms that have the same extension are co- but nonextensional. extensional, terms that have the same intension We can generalize and say that any expression are co-intensional. It seems that terms can be is extensional if its extension is determined by10-Perry-Gloss.qxd 5/14/12 10:07 PM Page 851 GLOSSARY 851 the extensions of its parts. Consider the predicate from worlds to extensions, and the intension of a “is portrayed as a human being.” Suppose this is sentence is a function from worlds to truth values. true of Donald Duck, because he is portrayed in extensional See extension. cartoons as having so many human characteris- tics. If we substitute “featherless biped” for extrinsic An extrinsic property is one that an ob- “human being” we get the predicate “is por- ject has partly in virtue of its relations to other trayed as a featherless biped.” This doesn’t seem things and their properties. A thing could lose to be true of Donald, as he is always portrayed as such a property without really changing at all. a feathered biped. For example, Omaha has the property of being In these examples, it seems possible to pick out the largest city in Nebraska. It could lose this the expressions that lead to the nonextensionality. property by virtue of Grand Island growing a In the first example it is “so called,” in the second great deal. Omaha wouldn’t have to lose popula- it is “portrayed as.” Expressions like these that tion to lose this property, or change in any other give rise to nonextensionality are often called way. Being the largest city in Nebraska is thus nonextensional contexts. an extrinsic property of Omaha. An intrinsic Some concepts that are very important in phi- property, by contrast, is one that an object has be- losophy seem to generate nonextensional sen- cause of the way it is in itself, independently of its tences. Consider “Harold believes that Cicero relations to other things and their properties. was a great Roman.” Because “Tully” is another The distinction is often useful, because a prop- name for Cicero, if this sentence is extensional, it erty that we might have thought to be intrinsic seems we should be able to substitute “Tully” for turns out to be extrinsic on closer examination. It “Cicero” without changing the truth value of the is very difficult, however, to give a really clear whole. But it seems that if Harold has never and precise explanation, or unchallengeable list, heard Cicero called “Tully,” “Harold believes of intrinsic properties of ordinary, spatiotempo- that Tully was a great Roman” would not be true. rally extended objects. The term intensional is used in three ways, one falsifiability See deductivism. strict and comparatively rare, one loose and very common, and one incorrect. Strictly speaking, an fatalism Fatalism is the doctrine that certain expression is intensional if its intension is deter- events are fated to happen, no matter what. This mined by the intensions of its parts. This is the might mean that an event is fated to take place at way Carnap used the term. It is common to use it a specific time, or that someone is going to do loosely, however, simply to mean “nonexten- some deed, no matter what anyone does to try to sional,” so that an “intensional context” means a prevent it. Fatalism differs from determinism. form of words, like “so called” and “portrayed as” One way they differ is that a fatalistic view about and “believes,” that leads to nonextensional pred- the occurrence of a certain event does not depend icates and sentences. Intensional is often confused on the laws of nature determining only a single with intentional in the broad sense that is some- course of events. There may be many possible times taken to be the mark of the mental. This is futures that differ in many ways, but they all will understandable, because many words that de- include the fated event. Oedipus, for example, scribe intentional phenomena, such as believes, was (allegedly) fated to marry his mother and kill seem to be intensional, in the loose sense. his father. This didn’t mean that there was only In possible worlds semantics, names, predicates, one course of action open to him after hearing the and sentences are said to have extensions at possi- prophecy, but that no matter which course he ble worlds—the set of things that the predicate took, he would eventually end up doing that applies to in the world. Sentences are also said to which he wanted most to avoid. A second way have extensions at worlds: their truth values in the they differ is that an event may be determined by worlds. The intension of a predicate is a function prior causes even though it was not fated to occur;10-Perry-Gloss.qxd 5/14/12 10:07 PM Page 852 852 GLOSSARY for among those prior causes may be the decisions known as modus ponens, is valid, no matter what and efforts of human agents. So determinism the content is. does not entail fatalism about all events. If P then Q feminism Feminism is an intellectual, social, and P political movement. The movement is very di- Therefore, Q. verse, but one strand that runs through all vari- eties is the conviction that important intellectual, Some philosophers have argued that philo- social, and political structures have been based on sophical confusion can sometimes be avoided by the assumption, sometimes implicit, sometimes putting claims into the formal mode rather than quite explicit, that being fully human means the material mode. To put a claim in the formal being male. Reexamination of these structures mode is to express it, as nearly as possible, as a from a perspective that appreciates the interests, claim about words or other symbols, rather than values, styles, ideas, roles, methods, and emotions about the things the words purport to stand for. of women as well as men can lead to fruitful and “Santa Claus doesn’t exist” is a claim in the mate- in some cases radical reform. rial mode, which may be confused or confusing because it looks as if we are saying something final causation According to the Aristotelian doc- about a thing, Santa Claus, who isn’t really there trine of final causes, the final cause (or telos) of a to say anything about. Better to say “‘Santa Claus’ thing’s existence is the purpose or end for which doesn’t refer to anything.” it exists. For instance, the final cause of a chair is sitting, and so on. Teleology is the branch of formal logic See formal. knowledge having to do with purposes and de- formal mode See formal. sign. A fact is teleological if it is of or related to teleology or final causes. Some arguments for the freedom In ordinary conversation we call people existence of God are teleological in nature; such free who aren’t prevented from doing what they arguments appeal to the apparent design or pur- want to do and conducting their life as they see fit. pose of human beings or the universe to argue for In politics and political philosophy, freedom usu- the existence of a cosmic designer. ally means having civil or political liberty, having first cause argument The first cause argument pur- certain basic rights or freedoms, such as those cod- ports to prove the existence of God as the first ified in the American Bill of Rights, the Rights of cause. In the world we know, everything has a Man, or the Charter of the United Nations. cause and nothing causes itself. The series of In the realm of metaphysics and the philoso- causes cannot go back to infinity, so there must be phy of mind, the term freedom refers to a very a first cause, and this is God. St. Thomas basic feature of decisions or actions. When we Aquinas’s second way of proving the existence of perform an ordinary act, like drinking a cup of God is a version of the first cause argument. coffee, or going to a movie, or helping a friend, Philosophers have challenged each step of the we have a feeling that our action results from our argument. own decision and that we could have done other- wise. It seems that only when this is the case do we first-order desires See second-order volitions. take full responsibility (blame or credit) for our formal The formal properties of representations are actions. A person might be free in this sense, al- distinguished from their content properties. “All though not enjoying freedom in the sense of po- cows are animals” and “all houses are buildings” litical liberties. A writer under house arrest, and have different contents, but the same form: All Fs prevented from publishing, would not enjoy are Gs. Formal logic seeks to classify inferences in basic civil liberties. But many of her actions terms of their formal properties. Where P and Q would still be free in this metaphysical sense. She are sentences, any inference of the following form, has coffee in the morning; she could have had tea.10-Perry-Gloss.qxd 5/14/12 10:07 PM Page 853 GLOSSARY 853 Perhaps she writes her essays even though she to the intake manifold of an internal combustion can’t publish them. This is a free act, in that she engine. One can contrast the function of a thing could have gardened or stayed in bed instead; if with its structure and the material from which it she had chosen to do those things, no one would is made. The structure of a carburetor differs have forced her to write. from that of a fuel injection system, although One fundamental question about freedom in both have the same function and are made of the this sense concerns its relation to determinism. If same types of materials. determinism is true, are any of our actions really Functionalism in the philosophy of mind is free, or is freedom simply an illusion? This debate the view that mental states are real states defin- often turns on the exact definition of freedom. able by their functions, specifically by their causal Compatibilists are likely to think of freedom as role with respect to stimuli, other mental states, being able to act in accord with one’s desires and and behavior. Functionalism can be contrasted decisions, even if those desires and decisions are with Cartesian dualism and behaviorism. Func- themselves the influences of more remote causes, tionalism agrees with Cartesian dualism in hold- outside the agent. This is compatible with deter- ing that mental states are real, but differs in that minism, in that one’s own desires and decisions the latter maintains that the mental states are es- might be the causes of one’s actions, even though sentially states of an immaterial mind, defined by those desires and decisions were themselves their basic nature, rather than their function. caused by other things, and lie at the end of a Functionalism agrees with logical behaviorism in chain of causes and effects that goes back to the seeing a definitional connection between mental time before the agent was born. An incompatibilist states and behavior. They differ in that the logical typically thinks of a free decision or act as one that behaviorist maintains that mental states are not is not caused by anything else, or is caused by the real at all; the terms that seem to stand for them agent, independent of external causes. are just misleading ways of describing behavior. The term free will is sometimes used to con- For the behaviorist, the definitions that connect trast with freedom of action. One’s will in this stimuli, behavior, and mental states are reductive; sense is one’s decision, choice, or dominating de- they show how to eliminate reference to mental sire. Even if one is free to follow one’s strongest states in favor of reference to stimuli and behav- desire, and hence has freedom of action in the ior. For this reason, a behaviorist definition of a compatibilist sense, does one have any control mental state cannot allow ineliminable reference over those desires and choices themselves? Can to other mental states. The selection from Arm- one influence the strength of one’s desires, or are strong explain and defend versions of functional- they determined by external influences? One ism. Nagel criticizes functionalist views in “What might be a compatibilist with respect to free ac- Is It Like to Be a Bat?” tion and determinism, but an incompatibilist Greatest Happiness Principle See utilitarianism. with respect to free will and determinism. hallucination, argument from See illusion, argu- In theological contexts, the question of free ment from. will is whether humans can have any choice if there is a god who has foreknowledge of what hard determinism See compatibilism and incom- they will do. patibilism. hedonism See the discussion of utilitarianism in free will See freedom. the Introduction to Part V. functionalism The function of a thing is its opera- hedonistic utilitarianism See utilitarianism. tion within a system. It is the role the thing has, when the system is operating properly. For ex- hierarchical model of moral responsibility Ac- ample, the function of a carburetor is to supply an cording to a hierarchical model of moral respon- atomized and vaporized mixture of fuel and air sibility, a person is morally responsible for her10-Perry-Gloss.qxd 5/14/12 10:07 PM Page 854 854 GLOSSARY actions only if there is a ‘mesh’ between her higher- The conception of ideas as immediate objects order preferences and the first-order preferences on of perception and thought, intervening between which she acts. First-order preferences are our our minds and the ordinary objects we perceive preferences about things—like a desire to have and think about, was part of a philosophical sushi for lunch or to go on a date with your sig- movement, sometimes called “the way of ideas,” nificant other. Higher-order preferences concern greatly influenced by Descartes’s Meditations. other preferences. I may, for instance prefer that Descartes there uses a form of the argument from my first-order desire for a cigarette not move me illusion to motivate the distinction between the to action, or I might hope that my actions will be mental phenomena we are certain of and the ex- guided by my desire to meet my deadline, leading ternal reality that is represented by them. me to stay home and work rather than go out identity A thing is identical with itself and no with my friends. When my higher-order prefer- other. If a is identical with b, then there is just one ences prevail and I am moved by the first-order thing that is both a and b; “a” and “b” are two preferences they designate, there is a mesh be- names for that one thing. It follows from this that tween my higher-order and first-order prefer- the relation of identity is transitive (if a is identical ences. At the most basic level of analysis, a with b, and b is identical with c, then a is identi- hierarchical model of the mind posits mental cal with c), symmetrical (if a is identical with b, states of different orders (first-, second-, and so then b is identical with a), and confers indiscerni- forth), and a hierarchical model of moral respon- bility (if a is identical with b, and a has property P, sibility exploits this sort of model of the mind to b has property P). give an account of moral responsibility. The term identity is not always used in this hypothetico-deductive method See deductivism. strict sense. For example, in this sense, “identical twins” are not identical—they couldn’t be twins ideas There are two quite different uses of the if they were, as there would be only one of them. term idea in philosophy. The term idea is used for We sometimes use identity to mean close resem- the denizens of Plato’s heaven. Sometimes form is blance in one respect or another. It is best, in used as a less misleading translation of eidos. philosophical contexts, to use identity in the way Plato’s ideas or forms are not parts of our minds, previously explained and some other word, like but objective, unchanging, immaterial entities similar or resembles, when that is what is meant. that our minds somehow grasp and use for the The terms numerical identity and qualitative classification of things in the changing world, identity are sometimes used, but are best avoided. which Plato held to be their pale imitations. One needs to distinguish between the identity of John Locke uses the term idea for that which qualities (red is one and the same color as rouge) the mind is immediately aware of, as distin- and similarity with respect to a quality (the couch guished from the qualities or objects in the ex- and the chair are both red; they are similar in re- ternal world the ideas are of. This use for the spect of color), and this terminology obscures the term leaves it rather vague. Idea can be the im- distinction. ages involved in perception, or the constituents Some issues about identity are raised in the of thought. Hume calls the first impressions, the section on personal identity and in “The Paradox latter ideas, and the whole class perceptions. For of Identity.” Hume, the class of impressions includes passions (emotions) as well as sensations. A feeling of identity theory David Armstrong in “The Nature anger would be an impression, as would the sen- of Mind” maintains that mental states are quite sation of red brought about by looking at a fire literally identical with physical states. Our con- truck. Later memory of the feeling of anger or cept of a mental state is of a state that occupies a the fire truck would involve the ideas of anger certain causal role; it turns out that physical states and red. do occupy those roles; hence, mental states are10-Perry-Gloss.qxd 5/14/12 10:07 PM Page 855 GLOSSARY 855 physical states. This identity theory is a species of an angle and an elliptical disk held at ninety de- materialism. It is also, strictly speaking, a form of grees might cast exactly the same image on the functionalism, because it maintains that mental retina and create the same experience. What is it states are definable by their function or causal that is the same? Not the objects seen, which are role. Many functionalists, however, think that different. The answer again is an intervening ob- mental states cannot be identified with physical ject, which may be taken to be a subjective idea or states. They maintain that the relation is a less something objective. stringent one, supervenience. Functionalism in The argument from hallucination considers this narrower sense is often contrasted with the the case in which it is to one as if one were seeing identity theory. an object, although there is in fact nothing at all there. This sort of case, a true hallucination, is illusion, argument from Philosophers use the much more unusual than those noted for the term argument from illusion for a general type of earlier two arguments. What is it that is present argument and for a specific version of it. These in our perception when there is nothing seen? arguments are intended to show that what we are It is, again, the subjective idea or the objective directly aware of when we perceive ordinary things sense datum. are not those ordinary things themselves. We can distinguish three such arguments: the argument immanent causation See agent-causation. from perceptual relativity, the argument from illu- immaterialism Immaterialism is the metaphysical sion, and the argument from hallucination. doctrine held by Berkeley. He maintained that The argument from perceptual relativity starts reality consisted entirely of minds (including with the fact that perceptions of the same object in God’s) and ideas. Ordinary things were collec- different circumstances involve different percep- tions or congeries of ideas. Berkeley thought his tual experiences. For example, a building seen view came closer to common sense than that of from a great distance casts a different-sized image the philosophers he opposed (Descartes and on your retina, and creates quite a different expe- Locke, for example), which implied the existence rience, than the same building seen from a few of material substances in addition to minds and yards away. Consider seeing a quarter held at a ideas. Berkeley explains in his Three Dialogues ninety-degree angle to your line of sight, and the Between Hylas and Philonous that he thinks we same quarter held at a forty-five-degree angle. In have no evidence for material substances, that the first case a round image is cast on your retina, identifying ordinary things with such substances in the second an elliptical image. The perceptual leads to skepticism, and in fact the very concept of experience is different, although the object seen, a material substance is incoherent. the quarter, is the same. The conclusion drawn is that there is something involved in the experience immutability Immutability is a property often, and besides the agent and the quarter, which are the traditionally, attributed to God. Roughly, a being same in both, that accounts for the difference. This is immutable if and only if that being cannot is the immediate object of perception. Some change. However, it is a matter of some contro- philosophers take these objects to be ideas in the versy whether and to what extent God is im- mind of the perceiver that represent the external mutable. Some theists have thought that saying object; see representative ideas, theory of. Others that God is immutable is theologically undesir- have taken them to be nonmental sense data. Some able. According to these theists, God does things philosophers have taken the ideas or sense data to like creating the world and performing miracles, be materials out of which external objects are con- and (it is argued) an absolutely immutable being structed, rather than representations of them. could not do such things, because doing them in- The argument from illusion itself starts with volves changing from doing one thing at one time the fact that two different objects can create the to doing another at another time. Such theists typ- same experience. For example, a quarter held at ically argue that God’s immutability should be10-Perry-Gloss.qxd 5/14/12 10:07 PM Page 856 856 GLOSSARY restricted to God’s character: God’s character (or number of philosophical arguments, such as what God is like) cannot change. Zeno’s arguments about motion, and in some of St. Thomas Aquinas’s arguments for the exis- imperatives, categorical and hypothetical See the tence of God. In the last two hundred years math- discussion of Kantian ethics in the Introduction ematicians have given us a clearer framework for to Part V. thinking about infinity than earlier philosophers impressions See ideas. had, but this doesn’t mean all of the puzzles and problems are easy to resolve. incompatibilism See compatibilism and incom- Infinite means without end. Let’s say that to patibilism. count a collection of objects is to assign the natu- ral numbers (1,2,3 . . .) in order to its members, so induction See induction, problem of and deduc- that every member is assigned a number and no tive argument. number gets assigned twice. Let’s say that to fin- induction by enumeration See deductive argument. ish counting a collection of objects is to assign num- bers in this way to every object in the collection. induction, problem of The problem of induction, A finite collection of things is one that one could sometimes known as Hume’s problem, has to do finish counting, at least theoretically, and say “it with justifying a very basic sort of nondeductive has n members” where n is some natural number. inference. We often seem to infer from observa- An infinite collection is one for which one could tion that some sample of a population has a cer- not finish counting. One can see from this that tain attribute to the conclusion that the next the set of natural numbers is itself infinite, for one members of the population we encounter will would never finish counting it. also have that attribute. When you eat a piece of Assigning objects from one set to those in an- bread, for example, you are concluding from the other, so that each object is assigned to only one many times in the past that bread has nourished object and has only one object assigned to it, is you, that it will also do so this time. But it is con- called putting the sets in a one-to-one correspon- ceivable that bread should have nourished in the dence. Sets that can be correlated in this way, are past, but not this time. It isn’t a necessary, analytic, the same size—they have the same number of el- or a priori truth that the next piece of bread you ements. Using this idea, modern mathematics has eat will be like the ones you have eaten before. shown that not all infinite sets are the same size, How does your inference bridge the gap? It is so that one needs to distinguish among different natural to appeal to various general principles infinite or transcendental numbers. The number that one has discovered to hold. But, as Hume of natural numbers is called aleph . points out, the future application of principles o Somewhat surprisingly, this is also the num- found reliable in the past presents exactly the ber of even numbers, as there is a one-to-one same problem. For example, consider the most correlation between numbers and even numbers general principle of all, that the future will be (assign 2n to n). But it is not the number of like the past. All one has really observed was points in a line for there is not a one-to-one cor- that, in the past, the future was like the past. relation between the set of such points and the How does one know that in the future it will be? natural numbers. This is shown by a variation of The problem of induction is stated in Hume’s An Zeno’s Racecourse Argument. Let the line be of Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Sec- length m. If we assign 1 to the point m/2, 2 to tion IV, and discussed by Salmon, “The Problem m/4,...n to m/2n, we will have paired a point of Induction.” from the continuum with each natural number, inductive argument See deductive argument. but no matter how long we go on, we will never assign a natural number to any of the points be- infinity The concept of infinity is a fascinating, yond m/2. tricky, and complex one. It has been used in a10-Perry-Gloss.qxd 5/14/12 10:07 PM Page 857 GLOSSARY 857 In thinking about infinity, it is important to true: “Fred believes that San Francisco is the cap- keep certain distinctions in mind. One might ital of California.” The object of the belief is the have two quite different things in mind when proposition, that San Francisco is the capital of Cal- calling a magnitude “infinite”: that it goes on for- ifornia. This proposition may be the object of the ever, or that the process of dividing it could go on belief even if it is not true. forever. A finite distance like ten feet is not infi- The term intentional should not be confused nite in the first sense, but seems to be in the sec- with the term intensional, although they are re- ond: One could take the first half, half of what’s lated. Many of the concepts used to describe inten- left, and so on without end. Intuitively, one can tional phenomena are nonextensional, which is traverse a finite, but infinitely divisible, distance one meaning of intensional. For example, “Oedi- in a finite amount of time, but not an infinite dis- pus intended to marry Jocasta” is a true description tance. Zeno’s Racecourse Argument seems to of an intention of Oedipus. If we substitute “his show that one cannot even traverse a finite dis- mother” for “Jocasta,” we change this truth into a tance. But keeping this distinction in mind, what falsehood. So the sentence is intensional. exactly does it show? interactive dualism See dualism. Aristotle distinguished between the potential and actual infinite. When we say that a distance intrinsic See extrinsic. of ten feet is infinitely divisible, we don’t mean intuitionism Moral or ethical intuitionism is the one could actually divide it into an infinite num- view that we can have some knowledge about ber of parts, but only that there are an infinite right and wrong that is not acquired through in- number of points in which one could divide it. ference. Rather, there are some moral truths that Aristotle thought that this distinction took care of we can “just see” or “just know,” perhaps through Zeno’s arguments. some faculty of moral intuition. J. L. Mackie crit- intension, intensional See extension. icizes this view in “The Subjectivity of Values.” intentionality An intentional act or state is one justice Issues about justice are traditionally di- that is directed at objects and characterized by the vided into issues about justice in the distribution objects at which it is directed. Intentionality in of benefits and burdens to different individuals this sense is a feature not only of intentions, but of and groups in a society (distributive justice) and is- many other mental phenomena. Some philoso- sues about the justice of various forms of punish- phers take it to be the essence of mentality and ment (retributive justice). consciousness. Think about how you would de- scribe your intentions. You don’t say what they laws of nature Many scientists take themselves to look like or feel like or sound like, or what mate- be engaged in the project of figuring out what rial they are made of. You say something like, rules and guidelines describe the universe and its “I have an intention to paint my room.” You say inhabitants at the most general level. That is, they what your intention is an intention to do. This es- are attempting to figure out the laws of nature sential characteristic of your intention is its object, that govern our world. For instance, Einstein dis- the event or state of affairs it is aimed at bringing covered the law of nature that nothing travels about. Similarly, if you are asked to describe your faster than the speed of light. Presumably there is wants, you would describe what you want—a some set of statements like this that is complete in new car, say, or world peace. The object of the the sense that these statements would completely want or desire, the thing or state of affairs that describe the behavior of the physical universe. would satisfy it, seems essential to it. These statements would be all the laws of nature Beliefs and other propositional attitudes are also (sometimes also called the laws of physics). For a considered intentional. We describe our beliefs discussion of how the laws of nature relate to de- by giving the circumstances under which they are terminism and freedom of the will, see Peter van10-Perry-Gloss.qxd 5/14/12 10:07 PM Page 858 858 GLOSSARY Inwagen’s piece, “The Powers of Rational Be- seem to refer to them are just parts of a discred- ings: Freedom of the Will.” ited theory of how people work). Functionalism is hard to categorize; perhaps it maintains the letter libertarianism See compatibilism and incompati- of property dualism but the spirit of physicalism. bilism. matters of fact and relations of ideas This is logical behaviorism See behaviorism. Hume’s terminology for the analytic–synthetic distinction, which Hume didn’t distinguish from manichean/manichaeism Manicheanism was a the a priori–a posteriori distinction and the gnostic religion that originated in Persia in the necessary–contingent distinction. Hume thought third century A.D. In philosophy, manicheanism our thinking is conducted with simple ideas that primarily arises in connection with its interesting are copied from impressions of external objects approach to the problem of evil. According to and complex ideas that result from combining manicheans, there are two co-eternal powers of the simple ones. The mind can put ideas together Light and Darkness that are in perpetual conflict. in new ways not derived from perception, so We find ourselves in the midst of this struggle. complex ideas need not correspond to external Because the manicheans, unlike traditional the- objects. These ideas also serve as the meanings of ists, give equal priority to Light and Darkness, words. Relations of ideas are truths that simply re- they do not have the problem of explaining how flect the way these ideas are related to each other evil came to exist in a world created by a perfectly and don’t depend on whether the ideas actually good being (such as God). apply to anything. Hume’s examples are “that materialism and physicalism Materialism is the three times five is equal to the half of thirty” and doctrine that reality consists of material objects “that the square of hypotenuse is equal to the and their material, spatial, and temporal proper- square of the two sides.” Such truths “are discov- ties and relations. Narrowly construed, material- erable by the mere operation of thought, without ism refers to material substances and properties dependence on what is anywhere existent in the as conceived in eighteenth-century physics and universe.” The contrary of a relation of ideas will philosophy, so that material properties are con- imply a contradiction and is impossible. fined to the primary qualities then recognized, In contrast, matters of fact have to do with including figure (shape), extension (size), num- what the world is like, and not just how ideas are ber, motion, and solidity. A more general term is related. The contrary of a matter of fact is possi- physicalism, where physical properties are taken to ble and doesn’t imply a contradiction. Hume’s ex- be whatever properties physics postulates in the ample is “that the sun will rise tomorrow.” This best account of the physical world. The physical- is true, and we are quite certain of it, at least most ist leaves open the possibility that the fundamen- of the time. But it is true because of what happens tal properties needed by physics will not be much tomorrow, not because of the way ideas are re- like the primary qualities of the materialist. A lated. Its contrary, “that the sun will not rise to- chief obstacle to materialism or physicalism is the morrow,” is not a contradiction. mind. Cartesian dualists claim that the mind is an Hume maintained that only relations of ideas immaterial or nonphysical object; other kinds of can be discovered a priori, and that no matter of dualists claim that at least mental properties fact can be demonstrated with only relations of are above and beyond the physical properties. ideas as premises. He argued that many principles The physicalist response has taken the form of philosophers had claimed to know a priori, such identity theories (the mind is the brain; mental as that nothing happens without a cause, were properties are physical properties), behaviorist matters of fact and could not be known that way. theories (mental terms are ways of talking about Most philosophers agree that mathematical behavior), and eliminative materialism (there are truths, like Hume’s examples cited earlier, are no minds or mental properties; the terms that necessary and knowable a priori. But many do