Factors of political participation

benefits of political participation and how has youth participation in elections changed
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Published Date:26-07-2017
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The Paradox of Voter Participation? A Laboratory Study David K. Levine, UCLA Thomas R. Palfrey, Princeton University Fioc ClaireINTRODUCTION Why do some people vote and others not? What affects turnout rates? Differences between poll predictions and actual electoral outcomes can often be accounted for by a failure to accurately predict turnout. This underprediction of turnout rates in mass election has been called “the paradox of voter turnout.” THE MODEL N participants Majority group- supporters of Minority group – candidate B « the supporters of B frontrunner » candidate A « the A underdog » Voting rules : voters decide to vote for their candidate or to abstain : ● If A(« underdog ») wins all members of group A receive reward of H ; all members of group B receive reward LH ● If B (frontrunner) wins all members of group B receive reward of H ; all members of group A receive reward LH voting is costly, and the voting cost to voter i is denoted c i ( voter i knows ci before deciding wheter to vote or abstain) distribution from which costs are drawn has density f(c) positive on its support a cutpoint strategy for voter i specifies that voter i abstains if and only if ci ci quasi-symmetric cutpoint equilibrium of voting game given by a pair of numbers (cA,cB) a cutpoint strategy for voter i specifies that voter i abstains if and only if ci ci THE EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN fix f throughout the experiment vary NA and NB payoffs L=5 and H=105 NÎ3,9,27,51 (odd numbers divisible by 3) each electorate size: two subtreatments ● landslide NB=2NA ● tossup NB=NA+1 choice of cost distribution (f) : uniform distribution of voting costs ranging from 0 to 55 satisfies both payoff for making or breaking a tie is 50 voters who draw costs greater than 50 have a strict dominant strategy to abstain and voters with costs equal to 50 have a weakly dominant strategy to abstain HYPOTHESES 3 MAIN HYPOTHESES (Comparative Statics Hypotheses) SIZE EFFECT COMPETITION EFFECT UNDERDOG EFFECT HYPOTHESES (2) 3 DERIVED HYPOTHESES (Specific quantitative hypotheses about turnout) UPSET RATES The size effect The competition on the frequency effect on the of Pivotal Events frequency of Pivotal EventsExperimental Protocol 284 different subjects Each session N was held fixed throughout the entire session N3 sessions, there were two subsessions of 50 rounds each : ● one subsession was the toss-up treatment ● the other subsession was the landslide treatment Before each round, each subject assigned to either group A or group B and assigned a voting cost Each subject gained experience as member of majority and minority party for exactly one value of N , and participated in both 50 landslide and 50 toss-up elections For N= 3, sessions were conducted slightly differentlyRESULTS (1) 1) Aggregate results ➢ turnout rates for the smallest The electorate are underd lower than og predicted effect by Nash ➢ turnout rates for the largest electorates are higher than predicted by Nash The The size effect competition effectRESULTS (2) Upset rates The competition The size effect on the effect on the frequency of Pivotal Events frequency of Pivotal EventsRESULTS (3) 2) Individual results and QRE ● The theory works well at the aggregate level ● At the individual level, the model fares less well (Individual behavior ➢ all individuals should be using exact cutpoint rules but obviously they don't ➢ consider that they follow a cutpoint rule stochastically ( follow it most of the time, but violate it some of the time) Results : individual behavior shows substantially more variation than Nash equilibrium allows → Use a quantal response equilibrium model based on stochastic choice (bounded rationality) The QRE model fits the data better (predicts even greater amounts of overvoting (relative to Nash), as the size of the election becomes larger and larger, which fits to the data) The QRE model provides exactly the right qualitative correction to the Nash model ( predicts less turnout than Nash equilibrium in the smallest election, and more turnout than Nash equilibrium in the large elections) RESULTS (3) CONCLUSION 1) All of the comparative statics from the standard Bayesian Nash equilibrium model of instrumental strategic voting were strongly supported by the data 2) Voters are highly responsive to voting cost 3) Few voters use exact deterministic cutpoint strategies; choice behavior appears to have a stochastic element 4) Voters were less responsive to changes in the parameters of the environment than the equilibrium. 5)An equilibrium approach based on the logit version of QRE provides a significant improvement in fit over the Nash model + an explanation for undervoting in small elections and overvoting in large elections 6)Not limited to elections (more general)THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION 

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