Sustainable Development in Africa case study

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PEACE, CONFLICT, AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: A READER Political Economy of Conflict Economic Policy and Peace Humanitarian Aid Human Development Demilitarisation Human Security State-Building Democracy Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Recovery Natural Resources Environment Conflict Sensitivity Conflict Prevention Social Mobilisation Youth Gender Edited by Erin McCandless and Tony KarboIntroduction The Africa Programme of the UN–affiliated University for Peace (UPEACE) is pleased to present Peace, Conflict, and Development in Africa: A Reader, another step in the effort to ameliorate Africa’s problem of access to practice- and policy-relevant scholarship and information that addresses the twin challenges of building sustainable peace and human development on the continent. It brings together historically important and more recent works from Africa and abroad that examine the role of political economy in conflicts and the methods and tools needed to bring about positive peace—meaning, peace that is more than the absence of violence, seeks to eliminate the root causes of conflict, offers social justice, builds respectful relationships, and results in self-sustaining institutions and capacities for enduring peace. Peace, Conflict, and Development in Africa is aimed at those involved in building peace in ways that foster human-centred, inclusive development and at those working in the devel- opment and economic spheres who want to ensure that their work does no harm and actu- ally supports and contributes to peace. It is also part of a broader effort to support the evo- lution of the emerging sub-field of peacebuilding and development, which must rise from 1 a foundation of understanding and formulate coherent responses to issues as they emerge. In turn, this integrated field of the study and practice of peacebuilding and development stands to serve Africa by reminding practitioners, scholars, and students that the drive for peace should not marginalise the vital priority of human development or vice versa. The reader is divided into eleven chapters, each introduced by an essay that contextu- alises the readings. The chapters cover a range of issues at the nexus of peace, conflict, and development. The organisation of the chapters flows from conceptual to more the- matic discussions that delve into core debates and examination of lessons and current directions in areas at the heart of this nexus. The reader opens with an examination of the conceptual and historical contexts of the relationship of peace and development (chapter 1) and then looks at investigations into the political economy of conflict (chap- ter 2) and the role of economic policy in undermining or promoting peace and human development (chapter 3). Subsequent chapters are structured around what some view as pillars of peace or peace- building while at the same time taking into consideration their relationship to the twin goals of peace and human development. These include the strategies behind humanitar- ian and development aid (chapter 4), demilitarisation and human security (chapter 5), state-building and democracy (chapter 6), and economic recovery and reconstruction (chapter 7). The issue of natural resources and peacebuilding, a controversial and impor- tant topic in Africa’s self-empowerment, is also addressed (chapter 8). Discussion of inte- grated peacebuilding and development strategies and tools of conflict sensitivity and conflict prevention, nonviolence and social mobilisation, and the role of African institu- tions round out the readings (chapters 9, 10, and 11). A section on Web resources highlights organisations engaged in activities at the peace and conflict and development nexus. It provides brief descriptions of their areas of empha- sis and the resources available through their Web sites. A selection of recommended resources for further reading concludes the reader. UPEACE’s reader and compendium sets are part of a series of publications produced to provide Africans and African institutions with difficult-to-find materials in order to cre- ate a platform for the institutionalisation of peace and conflict studies in Africa. Other 1 On this sub-field, see the Journal of Peacebuilding and Development,, and Erin McCandless, ‘The Emergence of Peacebuilding and Development: Scholarship and Practice’, in Erin McCandless and Abdul Karim Bangura, Peace Research for Africa: Critical Essays on Methodology, ed. Mary E. King and Ebrima Sall (Addis Ababa, UPEACE, 2007). xiiixiv Peace, Conflict, and Development in Africa UPEACE publications aimed at filling the critical knowledge gap in Africa include Peace Research for Africa: Critical Essays on Methodology (2007); the peer-reviewed Africa Peace and Conflict Journal, published bi-annually, in December and June; and the Nonviolent Transformation of Conflict—Africa series, which consists of the following titles: Teaching Model: Nonviolent Transformation of Conflict (2006); Strategic Nonviolent Struggle: A Training Manual (2006); Bite Not One Another: Selected Accounts of Nonviolent Struggle in Africa (2006); and Only Young Once: An Introduction to Nonviolent Struggle for Youths (2006). We hope that the collection of excerpts from critical voices presented in Peace, Conflict, and Development in Africa will be of great utility to academics, researchers, practitioners, and policy makers working to further peacebuilding and development that serves all Africans. Erin McCandless and Tony KarboCHAPTER 1 PEACE, CONFLICT, AND DEVELOPMENT: THE LINKAGES Erin McCandless and Tony Karbo Reflecting on African perspectives on peace and development in the late 1980s, Emmanuel Hansen argued that the dominant perceptions and practices of peace were not serving Africa. Hansen highlighted the limitations of a peace concept that addresses only the tech- nical question of the instruments of violence and views minimalist conflict management as a sufficient condition, or the only sufficient condition, for peace. For most African schol- ars, he argued, the peace and development problematic go together: Peace involves the resolution of conflict and also the transformation of extant social systems at national and international levels. It is a concept of peace that arises from Africa’s particular historical circumstances and responds to its developmental needs but is also applicable to the mass of humanity. A view specific to Africa, he argued, was needed that addresses historic North- South relations, including socioeconomic inequalities perpetuated by globalisation and northern policies. The premise of Hansen’s views, presented here in the introduction from Africa: Perspectives on Peace and Development, have since increased in value and recognition. Although insti- tutionalised linkages between peace and development are taking time to manifest, former UN secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s oft-quoted statement that ‘there can be no peace without economic and social development, just as development is not possible in the absence of peace’ was a powerful representation of early recognition. Consensus on the meanings of peace and development, and the challenges associated with actually inte- grating programmes and activities that fall within mandates of particular organisations and agencies, greatly challenge the integration effort. Truly integrating peace and devel- opment will require greater interrogation than may presently exist in terms of the actual policies and programmes, examination of their outcomes, and willingness to make changes accordingly. The selections in this chapter illustrate a range of conceptual and practical thinking on peacebuilding and development linkages. Erin McCandless—in ‘Peace and Conflict Studies’, Emergence of Peace-Building and Development’, and ‘Synopses of Major Concepts’— provides a historical summary of conceptual debates on conflict, development, and peace, placing African conceptions at the heart of the issues and concerns driving the new, inte- grated subfield of peacebuilding and development. Recognizing that conflict and devel- opment are deeply intertwined, as are, consequently, the building of sustainable peace and human development, the subfield of peacebuilding and development continues to evolve. Drawing on the dynamic interaction between scholarship, policy making, and prac- tice, it underscores the critical need for policy- and practice-relevant conceptions and research to better serve the challenges found most profoundly in Africa. Human development is a practical concept from the development field that is conducive to the building of sustainable peace and to preventing future conflict. The ‘National Human Development Report, 2006: Liberia’ outlines the important differences between the dom- inant growth model of economic development and the human development model, which shares much with more holistic, positive conceptions of peace. As highlighted in the report, human development encompasses growth and the equitable distribution of the2 Peace, Conflict, and Development in Africa fruits of growth, assuming both are essential for achieving human progress. A holistic con- cept balances these aims, viewing development as a process seeking to enlarge people’s choices, with multidimensional outcomes that embrace principles of self-esteem, partici- pation, and individual freedom. The human development report usefully places the con- cept in historical context, reviewing the institutional debates and the tools that have evolved to support its use—notably the human development index (HDI). By measuring standards of living, the HDI offers an important alternative to the growth model’s basis in gross national product, which does not account for distributional impact. The uneven distribution of development impacts, as highlighted throughout the reader, is often a source of conflict and a challenge for peace. Peter Uvin’s analysis of the ways in which the development enterprise interacts with con- flict and violence lays out seven conceptual, practical paradigms defining key peace, conflict, and development linkages. They range from rhetorical assumptions and related practices asserting that development (of the dominant growth variety) automatically fosters peace to military conditionality and the post-conflict approaches focusing on political and economic liberalisation to the ‘do no harm’, conflict prevention, and human security agendas, ending with the movement for global system reform. In ‘The Development/Peacebuilding Nexus: A Typology and History of Changing Paradigms’, he examines two particular variables: the extent to which conflict matters are incorporated into the very notion of development and the extent to which development explicitly engages in the political realm, running counter to the norm of sovereignty and the prac- tice of ‘a-politicalness’ that have historically underpinned development practice. He concludes that the key problem of much of the operational work in putting the development/peacebuilding nexus into practice is the weakness of the knowledge and ethical base on which this work rests. Uvin’s contribution and the others in this chapter lay the conceptual foundations for the chapters that follow and that together, it is hoped, will contribute to addressing these weaknesses and enhancing research and action to sup- port African peace and human development.Peace, Conflict, and Development: The Linkages 3 AFRICA: PERSPECTIVES ON PEACE AND DEVELOPMENT Emmanuel Hansen Excerpted from Emmanuel Hansen (ed.), Africa: Perspectives on Peace and Development (Tokyo, United Nations University; London and Atlantic Highlands, N.J., Zed Press, 1987), 1–21 Concept of the Peace Problematic Some people are apt to be startled or at the least raise eyebrows at the mention of an African perspective on peace. Peace, it is claimed, is a universal desideratum. This is not a contestable position. How then can we begin to particularize it by talking of an African perspective? How legitimate is it to talk of European peace or Asian peace? To concep- tualize peace in this narrow way is manifestly absurd. In addition to the theoretical prob- lems it raises it would seem to have undesirable consequences for peace scholarship as well as for the quest for peace and the peace movement. It compartmentalizes peace stud- ies into narrow, chauvinistic and national or local concerns and fragments the peace ini- tiative at a time when the need for unity is greater than ever. Although the state systems of most countries of the world claim that peace is desirable, the concept of peace, the obstacles to peace, what peace actually is and how it can be realized are issues on which there is no agreement. What is designated here as the African perspective is the consen- sus of a majority of African scholars on the peace problematic. To recognize that there are or could be different perspectives on the peace question is not to indulge in irresponsible relativism or to take refuge in philosophical anarchism of the type ‘all systems are fine; it all depends on your point of view’. While we seek to under- stand other perspectives which may be different from ours, we do not hold the position that all perspectives are equally defensible. The perspective which a group brings to the peace problematic depends on its history and material conditions as well as the position of the group within the power structure of the national or international system. If, as we have argued, certain perspectives are less defensible than others, then the question arises as to what yardstick we use to decide which positions are defensible and which are not. This should not be a difficult issue. For us the perspective on the peace problem- atic which we can defend and justify is that which makes it possible for the majority of the people on this planet to enjoy physical security, a modicum of material prosperity, the satisfaction of the basic needs of human existence, emotional well-being, political efficacy and psychic harmony. This we believe will enable the mass of men and women in the world to develop their potentialities and consequently themselves as full and autonomous human-beings; it will enable them to develop not as means to other ends but as ends in themselves. Willy Brandt captured the essence of this when he declared in a recent lecture that the vast majority of those who carry responsibility for their people and nations . . . are full of goodwill and . . . intend to solve the problems and let our world reach a state of security and well being. A state in which according to the capabilities of all its members mankind could 1 overcome oppressive misery and develop its immense resources. We are aware that many people or nations will not find it difficult to accept this general statement. The problem arises when we seek to attach definite meanings to these terms and when we seek to put these ideals into practice. We shall come to this later on. But we need to stress that it is this collective consensus shared by the large community of African scholars on the peace problematic that we call the African perspective. If we have taken so much space to establish and clarify this point, it is because of two things. We recognize that the peace problematic is not unproblematic even at the conceptual level; and we need to emphasize the difference between our own perspective and what I would call, for the want of a better term, the ‘establishment perspective’. Any African scholar who has attended any large gathering of peace workers, peace researchers and peace activists or followed the activities of these people will appreciate the distinction we are trying to make and will no doubt not fail to notice certain differ-4 Peace, Conflict, and Development in Africa 2 ences in people’s perceptions. It is important to notice these differences, not for the purpose of scoring political or intellectual points, but to lay the basis for a meaningful intellectual confrontation and a common struggle for world peace. We find that in cer- tain crucial matters such as the concept of peace, the nature of the peace problematic and the ways to seek peace our position tends to crystallize around certain ideas and themes and differs from mainstream European thought or the views held by the leaders of European states. Nowhere was this more amply demonstrated than at the recent sem- inar of African scholars called by the UN University to discuss peace, development and regional security in Africa as part of a series of regional seminars (its contribution to the United Nations International Year of Peace). The seminar was attended by a repre- sentative group of African scholars. It is therefore right and proper to call the ideas which crystallized at the seminar the African perspective. The papers which make up the vol- ume were all, with the exception of one, presented and discussed at the seminar. The present effort is limited to attempting a synthesis which captures the essence of the peace and development problematic as perceived and conceptualized by this representa- tive community of African scholars who gathered in Addis Ababa for the seminar in January 1985. We stated at the beginning that peace is regarded as a universal desideratum. Even peo- ple who wage wars claim they do so to maintain the peace. It was not only the ancient Romans who saw things in this way. It might have been hoped that over the years human- ity would have made some progress towards the goal of peace. But it is not so. To declare or accept that peace is a universal desideratum does make it unproblematic. On the con- trary it is clear that if everyone is for peace then different people will have different perceptions of what it is and what its purpose is. We can then legitimately ask the ques- tion, what kind of peace? What kind of peace was Reagan defending when he justified his invasion of the tiny island of Grenada in 1984? Or when he sent his war planes to attack Libya in April 1986? It is comforting to note that not all Americans went along with his reasoning. But it is also frightening to recall the number who swung to his sup- port and supported the invasion in the name of God and country. What kind of peace was Reagan after? Was it the peace of the strong and the powerful or of the rich, high and mighty to do as they please, unrestrained by law, custom, conscience or international morality? Was it the peace of a superpower to do as and what it pleases, to pursue its own interests without regard to the interests, security and concern of other nations which appear to be weak? It is clear that for Reagan peace means keeping the ‘communists’ out of areas of US interests; he is prepared to do anything, including using armed force, to accomplish this irrespective of what the people of the areas may feel. In this connection, even Botha, the leading white supremacist and leader of apartheid South Africa, says he is for peace. We believe him. But what does he mean by peace? For him peace means the acceptance of the current status quo. For Botha peace in South Africa can only be maintained if blacks and whites are rigidly segregated in all aspects of their lives and if blacks occupy subordinate positions in all walks of life. Anything else would create friction which would lead to conflict. He does not seem to recognize or admit that the present structure is the basis of much tension and conflict not only in South Africa itself but in the whole sub-region. Looked at in this way it is clear that the sort of peace which Botha wants is not the same as that demanded by the majority of the people of South Africa. Nor can we say that Botha’s perspective on peace is as defensi- ble as that of the mass of the population in South Africa. Botha says he wants peace; but he wants peace only to continue to oppress the blacks of South Africa. Most people want peace so that they can develop their potentialities fully as human-beings and attain psy- chic well-being. Botha’s ‘peace’ is dialectically contradictory to the people’s peace. The example of South Africa is one of the more grotesque; but it illustrates the point we wish to make. The question of peace cannot be separated from the question of the strug- gle for social and democratic rights and for human dignity. In other words the peace prob- lematic is not unrelated to the issue of extant social and political conditions and the dis- tribution of power. The consequence of this for policy options will become clear as we go on. But this point relates to two central issues of the peace problematic to which wePeace, Conflict, and Development: The Linkages 5 need to address ourselves: peace for whom and peace for what? It is only by probing such issues that we can get to the heart of the matter and set out the conditions which would be necessary for a lasting and meaningful peace. Any peace problematic which does not respond to this is not facing the reality of the situation. It is easily conceded that wars are fought not only for the defence of a given territory but also for the maintenance of a certain moral and social order. But it is right and proper to ask what values and ideals the social order we claim to be fighting for upholds and maintains. The peace question has to be seen in two aspects: peace should be conceptualized and perceived not only in the negative sense of minimizing or resolving conflict but also in the positive sense of creating material conditions which provide for the mass of the peo- ple a certain minimum condition of security, economic welfare, political efficacy and psy- 3 chic well-being. The two positions are intimately related not only for the purpose of analysis or as an intellectual exercise but as the only meaningful and fruitful way to face the peace problematic and define the practical conditions for societal peace and devel- opment. For us in Africa the minimalist condition of peace conceptualized as merely the removal, resolution or as it is sometimes less defensibly called, management of conflict, which leaves the social and material conditions which cause tension and lead to conflict intact, is unacceptable. It is unacceptable at both the national and the international level. It is this thinking which makes us say that, important though the anti-apartheid struggle is (and its removal would remove a major cause of conflict not only in South Africa itself but in the Southern Africa sub-region as a whole), its removal will meet only the minimum conditions for the promotion of peace in the sub-region. For a durable and lasting peace it will be necessary to develop mechanisms to ensure that the broad mass of the people achieve a measure of material and psychic well-being and control over the political processes which guide and order their lives. From this point of view it should be obvious why we in Africa perceive programmes of food security as more relevant to our immediate peace problematic than the star wars programme of President Reagan. This brings us to a separate but related question. This year (1985) Europe has been cel- ebrating forty years of peace. This, indeed, is a noble and commendable achievement and justly deserves to be celebrated. Such a long period of uninterrupted peace in one area of the globe noted for violent conflicts, and which has the greatest concentration of the most deadly instruments of destruction, is a rare occurrence in recorded history. But two observations need to be made. In nearly all the celebrations, the accompanying symbols and fanfare were symbols and accoutrements of war, not of peace. The imagery invoked was that of strength, not peace. There is a thinking among the European states and among certain people who hold what I call the establishment view of peace that peace is the result of strength. This is based on the Hobbesian concept of man as a naturally selfish and aggressive animal to be restrained only by the fear of death and terror. For some this is the only realistic view. It is a sad commentary on our evolution that although in science and technology we have devised techniques for solving problems which would have amazed Hobbes and those of his time, in the field of political and social relations we have not gone beyond his basic postulates. It could be argued that the focus on war which characterized the celebration of peace was meant to bring home to the present generation, especially those too young to know or remember, the full horrors of war and to allow those old enough to remember it to relive the horrifying experience. It was, how- ever, strength, especially the strength of armaments, which was displayed and which was centre-stage. This was underscored by statements made by some of the European leaders. Particularly instructive was that of Geoffrey Howe, the British Foreign Secretary, who declared that it was nuclear weapons which had kept the peace of Europe for forty years. President Reagan echoed the same sentiment. His insensitivity was amply demonstrated by his insistence on visiting Nazi war graves, an event which brought a justifiably sharp rebuke from Israel. To celebrate the peace of Europe by paying homage to the most dangerous protagonists of war the world has ever seen was an astonishing thing for a world leader with claims6 Peace, Conflict, and Development in Africa to desire world peace. If we have belaboured this point, it is to demonstrate an impor- tant flaw in what I call the establishment perspective on the peace problematic which sees minimalist conflict management as a sufficient condition, or the only sufficient con- dition, for peace. For Reagan it would appear that there is really no difference between the perpetrators of the most hideous crime against humanity and its victims. Both need to be remembered equally. Not even the most fervent advocates of the pluralist theory who make a fetish of maintaining a balance would defend such a position. Three things follow from this viewpoint. In the first place, for Europe world peace is European peace. It is true that to have succeeded in maintaining peace in Europe is an important achievement. But commendable as this is, Europe is not the world: to be com- pletely oblivious of the wars and conflicts, limited though they may have been in the rest of the world, for the mere reason that their existence did not disturb the peace of Europe, is to display an arrogance and insensitivity of the kind which can only undermine peace and collective security. At the moment there are many areas of conflict in Africa, Latin America, Asia and the Middle East. But these obviously did not enter into the calcula- tions of the people who celebrated forty years of world peace because they do not seri- ously affect the peace of Europe. This leads us to accept the position advanced in two of the contributions in this volume to the effect that Europe and the United States export their conflicts to the Third World. This helps them to maintain some measure of limited domestic stability. If this is the case it is not surprising that the world powers show such astonishing insensitivity to conflict in the non-European and ‘peripheral’ areas of the world. In addition to this concept of world peace as the peace of Europe, there is also a ten- dency, particularly among the nation states of Europe and the United States, to make the minimalist concept of peace the maximalist position. It is interesting to note that not only the extant state systems but even certain well-meaning individuals and organiza- 4 tions concerned with peace conceptualize the peace problematic in this way. The third aspect of the peace problematic which is closely identified with the European state sys- tem and also, we must regretfully say, with some peace groups and peace activists, is the concept of peace as nuclear peace. There is a certain thinking in the state systems of Europe and America and among the world powers generally that this is the kind of peace worth campaigning for. This is the kind of peace which world leaders such as Reagan and Gorbachev have in mind when they meet to talk about the arms race. It is a concept that sees nuclear weapons as the only threat to peace. It is a concept which regards peace as a balance of terror. To do this is to base the peace of the world on fear and mutual suspicion instead of mutual trust and cooperation. This, as we have already had occasion to point out, is no improvement on the Hobbesian position. The kind of approach which has characterized peace research in Europe and the United States is an illustration not 5 only of the dominance of this perspective but of its persistence. Although much work in peace research has now shifted from its earlier preoccupation with the arms conflict between East and West and has begun to tackle issues like the North-South relation- ship, the problem of creating stable political orders and the question of food security, this is more of a continental European viewpoint than a British or North American one. Not only do the states of Europe and America entertain this concept of peace as the right and correct position; they insist on imposing this definition on the rest of us. We are not saying that the dangers of nuclear war should be underestimated. For the first time in history humanity has developed instruments of violence which have the potential to destroy our species several times over. But to regard this as the only problem is to seri- ously misrepresent the issue. From our point of view it is not so much nuclear weapons which pose a threat but the social systems which bring nuclear weapons into being and the kinds of struggle for control of resources which make nuclear weapons necessary. We appreciate that it is easier to get agreement on limiting nuclear weapons or to seek their abolition than to obtain a consensus on appropriate social and political systems; but this is a position which, if adopted, still leaves the victims of oppression where they are. We support, and we shall continue to support, efforts to destroy, limit and abolish the use of nuclear weapons. But we are also painfully aware that before nuclear weapons werePeace, Conflict, and Development: The Linkages 7 invented we were dominated by Europeans through slavery, colonialism and now neo- colonialism. For us this is a painful reality. If all the nuclear weapons in the world were destroyed we would still be dominated until the social system which oppresses us and which gave rise to the creation of nuclear weapons were eliminated. So long as people are oppressed the basis of serious conflict exists. It is this which makes us say that a perspective on the peace problematic which addresses itself only to the technical question of the instruments of violence without looking at the deeper structural issues such as the system of power, both at national and international levels, is not likely to achieve much. This is why we say that for us the destruction of nuclear weapons is only a minimalist condition for the attainment of peace. It is this establishment conception of peace which the African position rejects: a conception which sees peace as the peace of Europe, or merely as the absence or management of conflict or as nuclear peace unrelated to extant social and material conditions. The African per- spective sees peace and development as intimately related: it sees peace not only as the resolution of conflict but as the transformation of extant social systems at both national and international levels. It is a concept which relates peace to the physical, social and existential needs of people. To sum up: we stress that the position we take on the peace issue is to articulate, defend and make practical a peace problematic other than the one defined by the superpowers or controlled by the transnational corporations. It is a concept of peace which, though arising out of our particular historical circumstances, responds to the needs not just of our own people but of the mass of humanity. We need to strive for a peace which not only entails the peaceful resolution of conflicts or the removal of major conflict in the main theatres of Europe, but also ensures peace in all areas of the globe and responds to the developmental needs of people at both the national and international levels. We are not claiming that we hold a monopoly of these views. We are only saying that this perspec- tive, which represents a consensus of the views of African scholars, underlies the papers presented in this volume. We are aware that certain individuals and certain peace orga- nizations also hold such a position. What is remarkable in the African situation is that many of the participants at the seminar did not perceive or define themselves as peace researchers, nor did they formulate their intellectual concerns within the established frame- works and paradigms of peace research; but once confronted with the problem, they responded in a way that put them on the progressive side of peace research and peace ini- tiative. For most African scholars there is no difference between the peace problematic and the development problematic. We are aware that even within the peace movement there are many individuals and peace organizations whose concept of peace is very close to that which we have characterized as the establishment perspective and which we insist should be rejected if the world is to attain any meaningful and lasting peace. To say this is not to condemn such peace movements but to state a historical fact. The perspective on peace we have outlined here informs our intellectual posture and political behaviour and is the concept of peace which we seek to put into practice; it is the concept of peace which informs the chapters and individual contributions which form this volume. The log- ical implications, as we shall see shortly, are clear. Social and Political Context of the Peace Problematic: The Global Crisis We are seeking to elucidate a peace perspective which, as we have seen above, runs counter to the position articulated and defended by the state systems of Europe and the United States and world powers generally. This in itself poses problems; not only do we not get support; we encounter serious opposition. What is more important is that we are seeking to put these ideals into practice at a moment in world history which is char- acterized by a severe crisis of global capitalism. This affects us in three ways. It reduces our capacity to confront the peace problematic; it enables the Western capitalist coun- tries to increase their pressure on us and it weakens the determination and capacity of certain progressive countries to assist us.8 Peace, Conflict, and Development in Africa In Africa the crisis has several features. At the physical level it is characterized by poor economic performance. Although it has now become customary for our leaders to blame this on the global crisis—and we should neither forget nor underestimate the impact of this on our economies—it should be noted that our problems predated the current cri- sis of global capitalism. The economic conditions in many African countries started to deteriorate in the 1970s and the present trends show even greater rates of decline. 6 Although GDP grew at an average rate of 3.6% in the 1970s it has since fallen. With pop- ulation growing at the rate of 3% per year it was estimated that income per head in 1983 had fallen to about 4% below its 1970 figure. Nowhere has the poor performance of our economies been more amply demonstrated than in the agricultural sector. Agricultural output has continued to fall. The drought of the last few years has not made things any better. Originally confined to the Sahelian areas it has now spread to many areas in Eastern, Western, Central and Southern Africa. It is now estimated that 36 countries are affected. The human dimensions of this are incal- culable. In Ethiopia about a million people are reported to have died, and many more have perished in Burkina Faso, Sudan, Niger, Mali and Senegal. The drought has aggra- vated an already bad food and agricultural situation. The African region now produces 7 only about 20% of its cereal requirements. Per capita grain production in the 24 coun- tries affected by the drought has been falling on average 20% per year since 1970. It is estimated that if this trend continues per capita production in 1988 will be the same as 8 in the drought-stricken year of 1984, even if 1988 has normal weather. It is true that the picture is not uniformly bad. Certain countries are worse off than others; but even the so-called ‘strong economies’ such as the Ivory Coast, Kenya and Malawi, often lauded 9 by the World Bank, the IMF and donor agencies, are not doing so well. Not only has agri- cultural production been declining, there is even a danger of a crisis of the entire agrar- ian system. To make matters worse there has been a virtual collapse of commodity prices. In addition to declining exports the terms of trade have not been in favour of the pri- mary producer. It has been estimated that between 1980 and 1982 the prices of non-oil 10 commodities fell by 27% in current dollar terms. This represented a loss of income of 1.2% of GDP for sub-Saharan African countries. It is not only in agriculture that the story is bad. Industry has also been an abysmal fail- ure. Much industrial capacity now lies idle and many of the early import-substitution industrialization efforts have foundered. The situation in West Africa is particularly grave. Here manufacturing declined by 6.8% in 1983; in East and Southern Africa it declined 11 by 1.9%, and in sub-Saharan Africa as a whole it fell by 3.3% in the same year. Relative to world manufacturing output Africa had a share of manufacturing value added of only 12 0.9% in 1980 and it does not look as if the figure is going to increase in the near future. If these statistics tell a depressing story the human dimension is even worse. It is banal to say that something needs to be done to reverse this trend. It is estimated that child mortality in sub-Saharan Africa, which was 50% higher than the average for developing 13 countries as a whole in the 1950s is now almost double the average. In spite of mas- sive imports in food and food aid it is estimated that about 20% of Africa’s population 14 eats less than the minimum needed to sustain good health. With projected GDP of 2.8% per year and a population growth of 3.5% per year we should expect, all things being equal, a fall in per capita GDP of 0.7%. A recent World Bank report concludes, ‘On this basis, real African incomes in 1995 will be so low that between 65 and 80% of the peo- 15 ple will be living below the poverty line, compared with roughly 60% today.’ The situ- ation is deteriorating. Another aspect of Africa’s current economic problem is what is commonly called the debt crisis. This has now emerged as one of the most serious burdens on Africa. Even the con- tinent’s ‘strong economies’ are not free from this. Even countries such as the Ivory Coast and Nigeria which benefited from the commodity price boom of the 1970s are facing seri- ous problems in meeting their debt obligations. Africa is rapidly replicating the Latin American experience. Debt service repayments are due to rise sharply in the future thus making the situation even more grave. The World Bank report for 1984 comments,Peace, Conflict, and Development: The Linkages 9 On the existing public and publicly guaranteed medium and long-term debt alone, they are due to rise from 4.1 billion in 1981 and 5. billion in 1982 to 9. billion in 1984, and an average 16 of 11.6 billion a year in 1985–87. Africa’s external medium- and long-term borrowings increased from 12.7 billion in 1972 to 99.7 billion in 1983, representing an average growth rate of 21.47% per year for the period. If we were to add undisbursed credits, short-term credits and ‘military aid’ (these figures exclude Libya and the lusophone countries of Africa) the figure would be even 17 larger. Such large external borrowings attract debt services which put a severe strain on the continent’s economy. Nominal interest payments by African countries increased from 18 0.2 billion in 1972 to 4.9 billion in 1983, a rate of 33.41%. Many of the new loans have merely gone into servicing debts and not into new investments or the rehabilitation of the economy. To fully appreciate the adverse effects of the debt crisis on the African economies it is necessary to quote in extenso. Another adverse impact of the debt crisis in Africa is the fact that when a debtor country accu- mulates arrears and/or announces intention to reschedule its debt, the flow of new resources declines due to erosion of the country’s creditworthiness. The erosion in creditworthiness also leads to higher costs of borrowing, both explicit and implicit. Higher implicit costs are reflected, for example in higher margins on imports and in more stringent conditions for import payments. The decline in new inflows, particularly private inflows, has forced many debtor African coun- tries to adopt contractionary measures in order to generate surpluses to meet debt-service pay- ments. These measures . . . have not only reduced economic activity but have also resulted in 19 quite heavy social costs. These statistics tell a depressing story, but it is the unquantifiable human dimension which tells an even sadder one. Development economists argue endlessly about the causes of these problems—are they the consequence of internal policy failures or are they gen- erated by the world economy? The mass of the people in Africa only know the effects as they impinge on their material and social lives. Although we made some impressive improvements in the period immediately following independence, particularly in the areas of education, sanitation and public health and transport and communication, on the whole, as the above statistics show, the performance of the post-colonial economies leave a lot to be desired. We have also faced serious problems at the social and political levels. At the present moment serious conflicts affect many of the sub-regions of the continent: Southern Africa, the Horn, Sudan and Chad, Eastern Africa, and the Western Sahara to mention only the most prominent ones. In addition to these sub-regional conflicts there are other no less serious conflicts at national and local levels. The sources of these conflicts are many. They can be manifested as ethnic or religious, the result of the claims of particular groups, or of conflict among the various fractions of the petty bourgeoisie which control the post- colonial state. Conflicts can arise in the process of nation-building itself. It is tricky to harmonize particular interests and claims with the urgent and persistent tasks of nation- building and we cannot always be sure that the necessary tensions can be handled in such a way that conflict can be avoided or minimized. In many countries in Africa we have not been able to work out effective and regular patterns of political succession and competing claimants often have recourse to the gun—with tragic consequences. This has undermined political stability and caused untold human suffering. One effect of such an unsettled state of affairs is the rise of refugees. Africa now has an estimated five million. Twenty years ago there were less than half a million. One in every 20 200 Africans is a refugee. (These figures do not include economic refugees or those who have been displaced within the borders of their own countries.) The depressing condi- tions of refugee existence, as well as its humiliation and demoralization, are too well- known to need repeating. In political terms the contemporary history of our continent has been marked by a steep increase in the rise of authoritarianism (not that it is a new phenomenon). This has been with us since the colonial period; but we have improved upon it instead of working for its elimination. Leaders who have come to power decry- ing the authoritarian rule of their predecessors have all too easily succumbed themselves. Of the 51 independent African countries nearly half of them are currently under military10 Peace, Conflict, and Development in Africa rule or have had at least one military government. Now a new brand of military regime is emerging on the political scene, practising a mixture of authoritarian populism and absolutism. The net effect is to push off the agenda the programmes for democratic rights and the aspirations of the mass of the people for democratic control of the political processes which order and guide their lives. We as intellectuals can argue and disagree among ourselves as to the cause and dimensions of these social and political patholo- gies; but we cannot deny their existence or the fact that they do not contribute to the improvement of the material conditions of the lives of our people. The only proof that we as intellectuals can offer of our commitment to the mass of the people is to come out with solutions. This implies taking a position dictated by praxis. We have here outlined the nature of the African crisis and its manifestations. At the eco- nomic level we have drought and famine, the near collapse of the agrarian system and low productivity of both agricultural and industrial goods. The crisis has been intensi- fied by the collapse of commodity prices and an increasing debt burden. At the social and political level it is characterized by conflicts and a rise in authoritarianism and military dictatorships and refugees. We argued that the global crisis enables Western capitalist countries to put more pressure on us and reduces the capacity of progressive countries to assist us. We shall now turn our attention to these questions. One of the basic features of the global crisis in the West has been the problem of capi- tal accumulation. Western governments have responded to the crisis with a combination of austerity measures, including the abandonment of welfare and the deliberate creation of unemployment. This is meant to increase the capital-labour ratio and consequently increase profits. The response from labour to these measures has been an intensification of the class struggle which has attracted further repression from states bent on reducing and disciplining labour. On the external level the Western capitalist countries have sought to deal with the developing countries in virtually the same way as they have tried to deal with labour. They have sought to do this through political repression and an increase in appropriation in order to discipline the workers of the developing countries. It is this which underlies their response to the demands made by the Third World for the creation of a New International Economic Order or the North-South dialogue or the demands which Third World countries have been making at various meetings of UNCTAD. These requests, 21 minimal though they are, have all been ignored. It would seem that both East and West share a basic consensus that the present international economic and power arrangements which militate so much against our development efforts, should be maintained. It is this which leads some to the conclusion that it would appear that the most relevant divide in the world today is not the so-called conflict between East and West but the contra- diction between the North collectively and the South collectively. Of course, no one would be naive enough to deny the reality of the East-West confrontation; but it would appear that both the East and the West are agreed about the nature of the conflict and that in this consensus the collective interests of Africa tend to be sacrificed. The IMF and the World Bank have been operating—in the words of Lenin—as ‘learned salesmen’ of the metropolitan bourgeoisie and gendarmes of finance capital in the attempt to solve the problem of the crisis of accumulation at the centre. The effect of this is, in the words of Samir Amin, to increase the ‘compradorization’ of Africa even fur- ther. The IMF adjustment plan, which is resented almost uniformly by every African coun- try, is the overseas version of the monetarist policies now being pursued with vigour in Britain under the leadership of the Conservative government. In Europe and the United States we see the same trend in the rise of the New Right. Its main purpose at the cen- tre is to subordinate labour more effectively to the rule of capital and thereby increase the rate of appropriation. In Africa the goal is the same. An IMF plan often demands massive retrenchment of labour, euphemistically called labour redeployment; trade lib- eralization with consequent denationalization of local capital; massive devaluation of local currencies (which could be defended on the grounds of bringing overvalued local currencies down to their realistic value but has had the net effect of drastically reduc- ing the purchasing power of the mass of the people) and support for authoritarian meansPeace, Conflict, and Development: The Linkages 11 of implementing such measures, often excused by pointing out the need for decisive and strong governments—with all that that means for civil and democratic rights. Political violence against individuals and groups which a few years ago would have caused uproar in both Africa and the international press now passes hardly noticed. There would seem to be a conspiracy between the metropolitan bourgeoisie and our local rulers to increase the pressure on the mass of the people. And in the name of what do the metro- politan bourgeoisie do this? In the name of capital. We have to admit that not all the countries at the center have been operating in this way. There have been progressive European countries, in Scandinavia in particular, and individuals and organizations com- mitted to our cause which have helped us in the past and still show some willingness to help. But the global crisis of capitalism is beginning to undermine both their capacity and their determination to offer us material support in a way which will lead to a real breakthrough in our struggle. This is the national and international political framework in which we are operating and in which we are seeking to respond to the peace prob- lematic. This is the framework which circumscribes our actions and establishes the param- eters within which we operate and pursue our objectives. It is important to understand this if we are to understand the nature of the peace problematic in Africa and our per- spective on it. Issues of the Peace Problematic: Conflict The basic starting point for the study of peace is conflict. We argued above that the res- olution of conflict is only a minimalist condition for the achievement of peace. The first real condition is to understand the nature and character of conflict in Africa. This implies two things: an identification of the salient issues and adoption of the appropriate meth- ods. On the question of issues some of the important ones to consider might be: the causes of conflict, the nature and dynamics of conflict, the patterns of conflict, the effect of conflict, the involvement of external powers in Africa’s conflict, the style and nature of this involvement and what it entails for the peace and security not only of the coun- try or countries directly involved but for the peace and security of the sub-region. Other issues could be: problems of conflict resolution, the mechanisms for peaceful resolution of conflict, the conditions for peaceful resolution and the effects of conflict on the devel- opmental goals of the country and the sub-region and region as a whole. There are sev- eral patterns of conflict in Africa. Thus, we have conflicts of secession, ethnic national- ism or self-determination. Space does not permit a detailed discussion of all forms of conflict here. Suffice it to say that the form is often only the outward manifestation of other deep-seated issues. It has often turned out that a conflict apparently caused by ethnic or racial divisions has been nothing more than a conflict between competing elites 22 for the control of state power and consequent access to certain material resources. It 23 is to the credit of the present generation of African writers that they have grasped this. Another feature of conflict in Africa is its sheer prevalence. We have already detailed the many instances of current conflicts in Africa both at territorial and inter-territorial levels. Since independence there is hardly any African country which has not experienced a major conflict of one kind or another. The geopolitics of the region mean that con- flicts in one area easily spill into another, with the danger that they may engulf the whole sub-region. Thus the conflict in the Sudan spilled over into Ethiopia and Uganda while the conflict in Zaire involved Angola, Burundi and Uganda. We have already seen how the conflict in South Africa tends to engulf the whole sub-region. In 1979 incidents in Amin’s Uganda led to an open military conflict with Tanzania and for a while threatened the security of the whole sub-region. Another important feature of the conflicts in Africa is the extent to which outside forces play a central role in maintaining them. It is doubtful whether the conflict in the Chad would have continued till now but for outside intervention. The same can be said of the conflict in the Horn of Africa and that of the Western Sahara. External intervention esca- lates conflicts and leads to arms transfers which in the last few years have considerably12 Peace, Conflict, and Development in Africa increased. In addition to the transfer of arms there have also been bilateral external agreements between African countries and certain metropolitan countries. The military 24 pacts between France and many of her former colonies are well-known. What may not be so well-known is the extent to which both the US and the Soviet Union are involved militarily in Africa. The US, for instance, concluded a mutual defence agreement with Ethiopia in 1975 (although this was abrogated in 1978 during the time of Ethiopia’s con- flict with Somalia), with Ghana in 1972, Kenya in 1980, Liberia in 1972 and Zaire in 1972. The Soviet Union also has had treaties of friendship and cooperation with Angola since 1976, Mozambique since 1977 and Ethiopia since 1978 (ratified in 1979). The Soviet Union has also concluded treaties of friendship and cooperation with Congo (1981), Egypt (1971) and Somalia (1974). Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mozambique, Nigeria, Somalia and Uganda have all received Soviet military assistance under additional military cooperation 25 agreements. These bilateral agreements provide access to naval and air facilities for the external power. The consequence of this is the possibility of drawing Africa into external conflicts. This not only endangers security in Africa but produces an atmosphere in which peaceful settlement of disputes becomes more difficult. Another feature of the African conflicts is their intractability. The conflict in the Southern Sudan has been going on since 1957 (close to three decades) and that in Uganda has lasted for almost two decades. Although mechanisms for peaceful settlement of disputes exist in the form of the mediation and reconciliation committees of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), they have not been successful. The OAU was unable to stop the Nigerian civil war; it was unable to stop the war between Uganda and Tanzania and has been so far unable to stop the conflict in the Chad, or in the Western Sahara or between Ethiopia and Eritrea. We have already shown how these conflicts lead to such a displacement of people that Africa now has one of the fastest growing refugee populations in the world. Two main approaches to the study of conflict in Africa can be discerned. One is the mod- ernization paradigm which tends to see conflict as endogenously generated; this looks for explanation to such factors as the conflict between primordial loyalties and the strains of the modernization process. The other I shall call, for want of a better term, the struc- tural approach; this uses the economic and political linkage between African countries and metropolitan countries as a wider canvas against which to work out issues of con- flict. This latter approach does not claim that external factors cause conflict in Africa; but they do lay down the parameters within which conflict occurs and they sometimes fuel them. It would therefore be futile to attempt to work out lasting mechanisms for conflict resolution without taking external factors into consideration. At the present moment Southern Africa is the most serious area of conflict on the conti- nent. It poses the gravest intellectual and political challenge to the African leadership. The chances of the conflict escalating into a major war with superpower involvement in the sub-region are ever present. South Africa is in a state of undeclared war against her neighbouring African states. Although South Africa claims that its action against the neighboring states is a response to guerrilla attacks on its own territory and is merely meant to attack and destroy guerrilla bases, and is thus part of its internal security oper- ations, it is clear that it perceives the existence of neighbouring independent black states as a major threat to its system of apartheid; that is the major reason for the attacks. They are meant to deny the African states bordering on South African territory a chance to develop self-sustaining economies independent of South Africa. South Africa wants to reduce the black states around it to the status of entirely and totally dependent bantus- tans which are in no position to offer any assistance, material or moral, to the libera- tion struggle in South Africa. This is the idea behind the Nkomati Accords with Mozambique and the Lusaka Agreement with Angola both signed in 1984. This is the main cause of the conflict in Southern Africa. It is therefore clear that the conflict cannot be meaningfully resolved without changes in South Africa itself. In the last few years the conflict in South Africa has escalated to a level where many peo- ple are predicting a major flare up in the area if there are no substantial changes in the apartheid system. It is clear that apartheid is no longer useful to capital, especiallyPeace, Conflict, and Development: The Linkages 13 finance capital. South Africa is becoming ungovernable and capital needs stable condi- tions for its reproduction. The social conditions in South Africa are now becoming an obstacle to further accumulation. So apartheid must go. It is not surprising that it has been representatives of industrial and financial capital who have been in the forefront of the demands to the government to seek some form of accommodation with the liber- ation movements. In 1985 a group of South African industrialists and financial leaders went to Lusaka to talk to the leaders of the African National Congress, an action which drew open rebuke from Botha, the apartheid prime minister of South Africa. When we con- nect this with the increasing loss of confidence shown in South Africa by the international business community then we know that the time for change has come. The critical ques- tion is, what kind of change? There has been talk of talks about talks; it is clear that some feelers have been put out to try and find a way out of what looks like it is becoming an ugly situation. The West’s main interests in South Africa are economic and strategic. It is therefore clear that any settlement will have to take this into account. It will also have to be based on the emer- gence of a black government moderate enough to calm the fears and maintain the priv- ileges of the white minority, at least in the short term, but militant enough to command legitimacy and keep the lid on the aspirations of the black population. This is possible but not easy in the current situation. To this extent the recent statement by Botha that he would be prepared to hold discussions with the ANC if it renounced violence and ter- rorism and cut off its links with the South African Communist Party and the Soviet Union is significant. There is one sense in which South Africa is uniquely different from all other ex-colonies. This is not because it has been independent for a long time, as is sometimes asserted; it is because of the importance of its strategic position to the NATO defence system and its possession of nuclear weapons. These two factors introduce an entirely new element into the situation. It is because South Africa occupies an important place in the Western defence system that the West has allowed it, and even helped it, to develop nuclear weapons. In fact it is claimed by certain strategic analysts that South Africa’s possession of nuclear weapons is less for the internal suppression of its black population than as part of the Western defence system against confrontation with the East. Seen from this point of view we can appreci- ate South Africa’s constant appeal to the West not to abandon it. From this point of view we can also appreciate the West’s dilemma over South Africa. In the event of black major- ity rule how can the West be sure of maintaining its strategic interests in South Africa? There are only two ways to achieve this. The West would have to promote a black lead- ership which would be so compromising that it could be entirely depended on, in the event of a confrontation, to allow the free use of its nuclear power and territory in the pursuit of NATO interests. This would present two problems. Considering the polariza- tion in South Africa, is such ‘moderate’ black leadership likely? What legitimacy would such a leadership have? The second strategy would be to integrate South Africa further into the Western economic and strategic defence system before majority rule; any suc- ceeding African government, moderate or militant, would then find itself so circumscribed that the imperatives of Realpolitik and political survival would dictate its operating within the general framework of the Western defence system. But this would not be easy to achieve and would probably founder on the legitimacy issue. Can a black leadership in South Africa, no matter how reactionary, be depended upon to use nuclear weapons on behalf of the West in the event of an East-West confrontation? Another option would be to dismantle the nuclear weapons in the event of majority rule if a satisfactory com- promise which would ensure the West’s strategic interests could not be reached. But this would deprive the West of a vital strategic base. This is the heart of the problem in South Africa. Whatever option emerges will depend on the nature of the struggle and the extent to which an accommodation can be worked out between the dominant forces in the con- flict. What will be the impact of these arrangements on the peace and regional security of the area? Should the West succeed in working out a formula which would maintain its strategic and defence interests in South Africa, it would continue to threaten the peace and security of the whole sub-region.14 Peace, Conflict, and Development in Africa Peace and Development We have argued that for us peace and development are inextricably intertwined. Removal of conflict, as we have argued, is only the minimalist condition for the attainment of peace. For a lasting and reliable peace to be attained, it is important to fashion economic systems which can generate sustained economic growth, guarantee for the mass of the population a certain minimum of material existence or basic needs. This would not in itself remove all conflict but it would eliminate some of the causes of tension which lead to conflict. It is not by accident that at a time of economic depression there has been an increase in inter-personal and inter-group social conflict. This has been made more likely by Africa’s poor development record. At the risk of oversimplification to the point of caricature, let me say that African devel- opmental paradigms in the last two decades have been characterized by three main trends: African capitalism, populist socialism or welfarism and Marxism. We should immediately qualify this by saying that all typologies—and these are no exception—simplify a com- plicated reality. And some African countries have been ecletic in their developmental choices. We should also judge development paradigms not only in terms of what a coun- try has actually been able to achieve but in terms of its aspirations. (This however is not to validate arbitrary self-identification.) We would venture to make a few cautious remarks about the criteria for identification. Is the state the main allocator of value or is alloca- tion left to the free play of market forces? Considering the dominant role which the state plays in nearly all African countries it will be necessary to consider this further. Does the state appropriate on behalf of itself, in the form of the creation of state capital, or does it appropriate on behalf of private capital, local or foreign? Is the basic form of social orga- nization of labour planned, cooperatized or collectivized? Are there plans to achieve this or is it considered desirable that capital should primarily be in private hands? What is the attitude of the state towards the welfare of the people? Does it attempt to be the main provider of the basic welfare of the mass of the people or is it the ideological postulate of the state that this should be the main responsibility of private individuals? On the basis of these questions it is possible to outline Africa’s three main developmen- tal paradigms. The Ivory Coast, Nigeria, Kenya and Malawi typify African capitalism. In these countries there has been a strong ideological preference on the part of the petty bourgeoisie which control the apparatus of state power to rely on the market mecha- nism as the main allocator of value and a tendency for the state to appropriate on behalf 26 of private capital (either domestic or foreign). The second tendency is what I would call welfare socialism or welfarism. Tanzania typifies this position perhaps more than any other country. Here the state is the major allocator of value and surplus is appropriated on behalf of the state. The social organization of labour is based on parastatals or peas- 27 ant collectives and individual peasant holdings. The third paradigm is the Marxist state which shares some characteristics of the populist socialist state. Perhaps the main dif- ference between this and the populist state is the role of the party as an elite group of dedicated cadres and a formal proclamation of state adherence to Marxism-Leninism as 28 an official ideology. Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia typify this pattern. It is important to stress that these basic developmental paradigms should be separated from the specific policy options chosen as a means of achieving developmental goals. Julius Nyerere’s recent remarks on nationalization, for example, should not be taken to infer that the entire populist socialist development model was wrong but only that cer- tain policy options chosen to achieve it were neither well thought out nor well imple- mented. Nor should we regard some of the recent shifts in policy in Mozambique on state farms and agricultural production as evidence of the abandonment of Marxism-Leninism. In our view they are an attempt to shift policy in another direction in order to realize more effectively the objectives of the developmental model. One aspect which must be stressed is the dominant and interventionist role played by the state in all models of African development. In addition to these general development paradigms there have been some specific strategies which have been pursued by nearly all African countries in an attempt to escape the legacy of underdevelopment; import-substitution industri-Peace, Conflict, and Development: The Linkages 15 alization is one of these. With the benefit of hindsight it has become fashionable to cas- tigate these policies; but they have been the main article of faith proclaimed by devel- opment economists as the sure way for African countries to escape from the legacy of underdevelopment and embark on industrialization. Another strategy is the continua- tion of the colonial policy of primary product promotion; a third which is now being vig- orously advocated by finance capital in the form of the World Bank and the IMF is export- led industrialization. This is designed to increase the export of primary products as a way of building up surpluses which can then be used to modernize and industrialize agricul- ture, so preparing the base for further industrialization. Without getting into a long dis- cussion on this it has to be said that there is only a very limited market for the expan- sion of primary products for export—as Nkrumah was to realize in 1965 when Ghana produced twice the amount of cocoa it produced in 1955 but earned only half the 1955 value. There may be likely benefits when only a few countries embark on this policy, but were all African countries to adopt it it would become self-defeating. The African development experience for the last two decades has been a major disap- pointment, whatever the developmental options. The hopes of the early 1960s have not been fulfilled and disillusionment seems to have set in. This has led to a sobering reap- praisal which has resulted in many debates. These have led to the emergence of two main schools of thought. The modernization school, relying on the historical framework of the development of capitalism in the West, puts forward a model in which through the process of diffusion of innovation and the provision of certain inputs like capital, managerial training, change of attitudes and the removal of archaic and outmoded processes, devel- opment is seen as a linear progression from the present underdevelopment of Africa to a replica of Europe. The basic assumption here is that the transition is replicable. If that is true then all that is required is the realization of its potential. According to this model African capitalism is not only possible, but desirable; it is the one sure road to success. 29 Rostow, Hagen and others have produced the intellectual basis of this position. Its defenders point to the record of impressive growth rates particularly in the agriculture of the Ivory Coast. As Crawford Young has ably noted, the disasters of Zaire, a country which has also followed this road, or Nigeria, which in spite of its enormous oil revenues seems to be in no better position than some others less well endowed, are hardly men- 30 tioned. The modernization school concedes that colonialism had some very unsavoury aspects and cannot in all respects be defended on moral grounds; but it argues that on political and economic grounds it is defensible. Colonial capitalism turned stagnant and archaic African societies into rudimentary forms of the modern economy characterized by the cash nexus. It enabled Africans to enter into the cash economy and therefore begin to accumulate a surplus. What needs to be done is to work out a system to continue this process and remove the obstacles which colonialism put in the way of African accumu- lation. Posed in this way the theory finds it possible to condemn colonialism without condemning capitalism. This has provided a much needed and convenient intellectual umbrella for liberals of all shades. For some time the modernization paradigm dominated the intellectual landscape until it was decisively demolished by Andre Gunder Frank in his now famous essay Sociology of 31 Underdevelopment and Underdevelopment of Sociology. In a subsequent work in which he acknowledged his intellectual debt to Paul Baran, he argued that, far from having no developmental function in Latin America, capitalism had been responsible for its cur- 32 rent underdevelopment. This argument had an immediate impact in intellectual and political circles and was applied to Africa. One of the most important and influential works 33 on this subject was Walter Rodney’s How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. This provided an intellectual and political justification for the countries which had made a policy choice against capitalism. If it is argued that capitalism has underdeveloped Africa then it stands to reason that a minimum condition for development is disengagement from capitalism and the creation of an alternative system; socialism is seen on both ethical and economic grounds as the most viable choice for African countries. Julius Nyerere’s speech ‘The Rational Choice’, which he gave to a gathering of intellectuals and leaders of the Sudanese Socialist Party Union in 1973 in Khartoum, is one of the most eloquent statements on 34 the issue. Those who take this position also counter the argument about the impres-16 Peace, Conflict, and Development in Africa sive growth rates of countries like the Ivory Coast and Malawi with the claim that such growth rates have been obtained by depriving the mass of the people of welfare services; in any case the growth is temporary. But as we have pointed out, in neither case have the results been impressive. Of late the modernization theory has been resuscitated, strangely enough by certain Marxists who claim that capitalism has not underdeveloped the developing countries. On the contrary, it can and does develop underdeveloped coun- tries. This position was first and vigorously put forward by Bill Warren in his Imperialism: 35 Pioneer of Capitalism in which the essentials of the modernization theory are presented in Marxist terms. He uses selective examples from South-East Asia to try and demonstrate his case. In Africa, Goran Hyden has been perhaps the most foremost defender of this position. His work Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania is a serious indictment of Tanzania’s devel- opment strategy which he regards as premature and wrong. His subsequent work states 36 the same position. At present there is no dominant paradigm and development theory is in a state of limbo. What is important is to develop a holistic approach to the prob- lem which will combine useful insights from different paradigms—always bearing in mind the need to regard the peace and development problematics as inseparable. Peace and Development: The African Perspective: A Challenge to Europe If we are right in what we have been saying so far on the concept of peace, the intri- cate relationship between peace and development, and the need not only to understand and study the peace problematic but to put it into practice, and the recognition that peace in one corner of the world is related to peace in another corner of the world, the next question becomes, what is Europe’s response to the peace and development prob- lematic of Africa? It would be presumptuous for us to tell Europe and the United States what they should do. But we have the right to state what we expect if our assumption of a common humanity and destiny and universal desire for the collective peace and development of the world is correct. We ask for a greater degree of commitment and sup- port for the demands of the Third World—particularly in the form of the creation of a New International Economic Order. Limited though the proposals are, they are steps in the right direction. The Third World has also made demands for a change in the international power system. We have lately seen the emergence of what we might call the New Right. The leading figures of this are President Reagan, Mrs. Thatcher and Chancellor Kohl. Their attitudes towards Africa and the Third World are marked by contemptuous arrogance and belligerence. This does not augur well for the prospects for world peace. These leaders have been in the forefront of the drive to intensify the compradorization of Africa and the Third World. These trends must be reversed and the strong support for the collective 37 efforts of Africa and the Third World contained in the Brandt Report is the minimum we should expect from Europe and the United States. We have argued that of all the areas of conflict in Africa, South Africa poses the most serious threat not only to the peace of the area but to the continent as a whole and consequently to the world. South Africa has been engaged in a protracted struggle to destabilize the economies and governments of its neighbours, particularly Angola, Mozambique and now even Botswana. This is for no other reason than that South Africa cannot tolerate the existence of an African state close to its border which is sufficiently independent-minded, economically successful and nationalistic to provide inspiration and moral and material support to the liberation struggle in South Africa and Namibia. South Africa has extensive military, political and economic links with the Western countries and the United States. We would like progressive opinion to be brought to bear on South Africa to abandon its path of destruction and violence. Africa has been heartened by the kind of public response which was aroused in Europe in response to the famine appeal. Millions of pounds were collected for the victims. While we are grateful for such a show of humanity we would like to see an equal importance attached to efforts by people in these areas to create self-sustaining economies to improve the qual- ity of their lives and become independent; the next time such disasters occur they will then be in a better position to withstand them without international charity.Peace, Conflict, and Development: The Linkages 17 We have seen how the current crisis in Africa is making even feeble attempts at demo- cratic government a thing of the past. The United States and Western governments have been supporting unashamedly authoritarian governments so long as their so-called lead- ers offer protection and security for capital. If we regard democratic structures as desir- able in themselves and as instrumental for achieving peace and stability then we would expect Europe to support the initiatives, few and limited though they are at the moment, to create democratic structures which will make it possible for the mass of the people to have meaningful control over the political processes which control and guide their lives. This is the only way in which we can ensure peace and development in Africa. If Europe and the United States are truly interested in peace and development in Africa. If Europe and the United States are truly interested in peace these are minimum conditions which could be met without any difficulty. PEACE AND CONFLICT STUDIES: ORIGINS, DEFINING ISSUES, CURRENT STATUS Erin McCandless Excerpted from Erin McCandless and Abdul Karim Bangura, Peace Research for Africa: Critical Essays on Methodology, ed. Mary E. King and Ebrima Sall (Addis Ababa, UPEACE Africa Programme, 2007), 40–46 Peace studies comprise a field of inquiry with roots in philosophical idealism, which has been developing for more than a century and seeks to help societies learn to become more peaceable. Conflict studies—based initially on inquiries into industrial disputes—has emerged more recently as a sub-discipline of peace studies. For the sake of simplicity, these two areas are often conflated as peace and conflict studies. In Africa, peace and conflict studies constitute a new area of institutionalised study, although some elements of the field have been developing for decades in the social sciences. Because of its rel- atively young status, there remains work to be done in shedding characterisations of ‘wooliness’ that often accompanies new disciplines. Debates on whether peace and con- flict studies constitute a field, a discipline, or merely an approach have been for the most part inconclusive. Nevertheless, considerable consensus exists concerning certain of its attributes. For example, it is interdisciplinary, policy oriented, and maintains a normative commitment to certain values. There is certainly room for and merit in making the case that peace and conflict studies constitutes a ‘discipline’. It has literatures, theories, and academic journals. Galtung (1996:9) has argued that peace studies—which for him involves the study of peace and conflict—is an applied social science because it focuses on human beings in a social set- ting and has an explicit value orientation. He articulates three epistemological branches of peace studies that illustrate the richness and diverse nature of the discipline: • empirical peace studies: based on empiricism and referred to as mainstream, or tradi- tional, social science, which is the systematic comparison of theories with empirical reality; • critical peace studies: based on criticism, taking explicit stands with respect to data and values with reference to the future particularly in terms of policy; and • constructive peace studies: based on constructivism, the systematic comparison of theories with values. Traditionalists maintain that an empirical or mainstream scientific approach is the only ‘real’ or truly legitimate form of research, but Galtung argues that empirical peace stud- ies, although indispensable, is not the final product. Rather, it is ‘only the beginning of a complex process, much more difficult than empirical studies alone’ (1996:9–11).