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Writing, building, loading, and using code on SIM Cards.

Writing, building, loading, and using code on SIM Cards. 19
Karl Koscher – supersat Eric Butler – codebutler Writing, building, loading, and using code on SIM Cards.  Toorcamp 2012  Hacker camp on WA coast  Project: Run a GSM network.  My task: Procure SIM Cards. 2  “Subscriber Identity Module”  Contains an identity (IMSI) and symmetric key (Ki).  “Secure” (key can’t be extracted; can’t be cloned)  Used by GSM carriers and now LTE (Verizon)  Can also run apps 3  Long ago…  Applications live on your SIM card.  Phones are dumb hosts – UI and connectivity only.  Telcos own the SIMs, so they control the applications.  Mostly obsolete today 4 Still around decade later, mostly unchanged. 5 SIM Cards are mysterious little computers in your pocket that you don’t control. 6  Needed SIMs for Toorcamp anyway, why not get SIMs that supported apps  This ended up taking many months.  Very little documentation about all this.  After lots of research, finally figured out how to program the ing things.  Learn from our misery. 7 Chip Field Description Generic Description 64K JavaCard 2.1.1 WIB1.3 USIM Platform Atmel AT90SC25672RU CPU Architecture 8bit AVR Technology 0.15uM CMOS ROM 256KB ROM Program Memory Nonvolatile memory 72 KB EEPROM RAM 6 KB Internal operating frequency Between 20 30 MHz Endurance Typically 500 000 write/erase cycles 8 9  Runs on SIM card CPU, separate from phone.  Connected directly to baseband.  Can be silently remotely installed (by carrier).  Supported by most carrier SIMs.  Cards support multiple apps, selected by AIDs  Apps managed by a “master” card manager app  GSM “SIM” is actually just an applet on a UICC (the physical card). 10  Rudimentary UI – display text, menus, play tones, read input.  Works with most modern smartphones.  Dumbphones too.  Launch URLs.  Send SMSes, initiate calls, initiate and use data services.  Receive and act on events, such as call connected, call disconnected, etc.  Interact with the rest of the SIM card.  Run arbitrary AT commands on the phone. 11  Not very common in US  But used widely in the developing world  Mobile banking, etc. 12  Smart Cards – Physical connection between SIM and phone, same as any smart card.  Java Card – Java for Smart Cards. Easiest way to write applets.  SIM Toolkit (STK) API – Interface between applets and phone UI.  GlobalPlatform – Standard for loading and managing applications on a card. 13  Designed for secure storage and computation  Communication is via packets called APDUs Optional Command Dependent Instruction Length Class Param 1 Param 2 Data Expected Length MSB LSB 14  It’s Java  … not really.  No garbage collection.  No chars, no strings, no floats, no multidimensional arrays.  ints are optional.  No standard API, no threads, etc.  Verification can be offloaded.  But there are Exceptions  Instance and class variables are saved in EEPROM, which has limited write cycles. 15  There are specialized commercial IDEs for this, but you can do without.  Download the Java Card Development Kit from Oracle (it’s free).  If you’re using Eclipse, remove the JRE system library and add the Java Card library  We also wrote tools to make things easier 16  App is loaded onto the card.  App registers itself with the SIM Toolkit API.  Phone informs STK of its capabilities.  STK informs the phone about registered apps.  Selection of an app will trigger an event to be delivered to the app.  App can then send UI requests back to phone. 17 18 19 public class CryptoChallenge extends Applet implements ToolkitConstants, ToolkitInterface private byte hintsGiven; private byte mainMenuItem; private static byte menuItemText = new byte 'C', 'r','e', 'd', 'i', 't', 's' ; private static byte needHints = new byte 'N', 'e', 'e', 'd', ' ', 's', 'o', 'm', 'e', ' ', 'h', 'i', 'n', 't', 's', ''; private static byte yes = new byte 'Y', 'e', 's' ; private static byte no = new byte 'N', 'o' ; private static byte hints = new byte 'H', 'i', 'n', 't', 's' ; 20 private CryptoChallenge() hintsGiven = 0; ToolkitRegistry reg = ToolkitRegistry.getEntry(); mainMenuItem = reg.initMenuEntry(menuItemText, (short)0, (short)menuItemText.length, PROCMDSELECTITEM, false, (byte)0, (short)0); public static void install(byte bArray, short bOffset, byte bLength) CryptoChallenge applet = new CryptoChallenge(); applet.register(); 21 public void processToolkit(byte event) throws ToolkitException EnvelopeHandler envHdlr = EnvelopeHandler.getTheHandler(); if (event == EVENTMENUSELECTION) byte selectedItemId = envHdlr.getItemIdentifier(); if (selectedItemId == mainMenuItem) ProactiveHandler proHdlr = ProactiveHandler.getTheHandler(); if (hintsGiven == 0) proHdlr.initDisplayText((byte)0, DCS8BITDATA, credits, (short)0, (short)(credits.length)); proHdlr.send(); hintsGiven = (byte)0x80; return; 22 proHdlr.init(PROCMDSELECTITEM, (byte)0x00, (byte)ToolkitConstants.DEVIDME); proHdlr.appendTLV((byte)TAGALPHAIDENTIFIER, needHints, (short)0x0000, (short)needHints.length); proHdlr.appendTLV((byte)TAGITEM, (byte)1, yes, (short)0x0000, (short)yes.length); proHdlr.appendTLV((byte)TAGITEM, (byte)2, no, (short)0x0000, (short)no.length); proHdlr.send(); ProactiveResponseHandler rspHdlr = ProactiveResponseHandler.getTheHandler(); byte selItemId = rspHdlr.getItemIdentifier(); if (selItemId == 2) // No proHdlr.initDisplayText((byte)0, DCS8BITDATA, credits, (short)0, (short)(credits.length)); proHdlr.send(); 23 public void process(APDU apdu) throws ISOException // ignore the applet select command dispached to the process if (selectingApplet()) return; byte buffer = apdu.getBuffer(); if (bufferISO7816.OFFSETCLA = (byte)0x80) ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SWCLANOTSUPPORTED); if (bufferISO7816.OFFSETINS == 0x61) buffer0 = hintsGiven; apdu.setOutgoingAndSend((short)0, (short)1); return; ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SWINSNOTSUPPORTED); 24  You must target Java 1.1 bytecode 1.3 source code compatibility is okay. javac cp javacard/lib/api21.jar \ target 1.1 \ source 1.3 \ HelloApplet.java 25  After you have your .class files, you need to convert them to Java Card bytecode.  Use the converter tool in the SDK  Need to specify application ID (more on this in a minute), API export directory, etc.  java jar javacard/bin/converter.jar \ exportpath javacard/api21exportfiles \ applet 0xde:0xfc:0x09:0x20:0x13:0x01 \ com.example.HelloCard.HelloApplet \ com.example.HelloCard 0xde:0xfc:0x09:0x20:0x13 1.0 26  We also have Makefiles for your convenience  http://simhacks.github.io  Converter outputs a CAP file, which is a ZIP archive of CAP components (JavaCard bytecode). 27  Two types of readers:  PCSC (PC/Smartcard API)  Serial  Doesn’t really matter, but PCSC will be more flexible.  All readers are the same, so get a cheap one.  I like the SCR3500 because it folds up (8 on ebay). 28  Had an applet ready to go, couldn’t get it loaded  Tried using popular GPShell tool, no success.  SIM vendor had recommended software  Was no longer available anywhere.  They wanted 600 (and they don’t even own it…) 29 30  A standard for loading and managing apps on Java Cards.  Defines the card manager app.  Protocols and commands used.  Authentication and encryption.  Also deals with offcard responsibilities.  e.g. issuer needs to verify applet binaries. 31  All apps are loaded and authorized by the Issuer Security Domain – in practice this means that you can’t load apps onto a card you didn’t issue yourself :(  … or maybe you can – see Karsten Nohl’s work  On pure GlobalPlatform cards, the ISD is the default app on prepersonalized cards  Accessing it on our SIM cards is a lot harder 32  Installing an app is a twostep process:  Load the binary (LOAD)  Instantiate the app (INSTALL)  Loading an app first requires authorization through the INSTALL for LOAD command  The individual CAP components are concatenated together and sent in blocks with LOAD  There are THREE AIDs involved:  Application AID – associated with the load file  Module AID – associated with the main class  Instance AID – used to select a particular instance 33  The only way to talk to the SIM’s ISD is through the overtheair update mechanism  i.e. SMS packets  We don’t have to actually send SMSes, but we need to generate commands to the card with SMS packets 34  CAT ENVELOPE (A0 C2)  SMSPP Download (D1) ▪ Device Identities ▪ SMSTPDU (GSM 03.40) ▪ Header ▪ User Data  Header  Command Packet  Header (Security parameters, app selection)  Uses a 3 byte TAR ID  Holy shit powerpoint supports this much nesting  This is the actual limit  APDU 35  In case you missed it, you can use this exact mechanism to remotely send APDUs to a SIM card()  Cell broadcast can also be used  Normally you need to authenticate to do this  Karsten Nohl: Many errors come back with crypto, which can be used to bruteforce the DES key 36  Python  Works on OSX, Linux, Windows  Load: shadysim.py \ pcsc \ l CryptoChallenge.cap 37  Install: shadysim.py \ pcsc \ i CryptoChallenge.cap \ moduleaid d07002ca4490cc01 \ instanceaid d07002ca4490cc0101 \ enablesimtoolkit \ maxmenuentries 1 \ maxmenuentrytext 10 \ nonvolatilememoryrequired 0100 \ volatilememoryforinstall 0100 38  List apps (not instances): shadysim.py \ pcsc \ t 39 40  Turn off phone  Take out SIM card (and often battery too).  Put SIM card into reader.  Load new code.  Take SIM card out of reader.  Place back into phone (and replace battery).  Wait for phone to boot.  See if code works. 41  Can we do any better 42  SEEK: Opensource Android SDK for smart cards.  Includes patches to Android emulator for SIM access using USB PCSC reader  Avoid hassle of swapping SIM between computer and phone. 43  Most radio interfaces don’t provide support for this.  Remote SIM Access Protocol may provide solution.  Reverseengineered protocol/auth scheme.  Need to write app that sends/receives APDUs. 44  STK apps are pretty limited, but there is potential for awesomeness  SIM card botnet  Integrating Android apps with SIM applets  SSH private keys secured on your SIM  Secure BitCoin transactions  What else ▪ Of course, we need carriers to get on board  Android app for OTA installs 45  SWP: Single Wire Protocol  Direct connection between SIM card and NFC controller.  SIM Card acts as “secure element”. http://www.theregister.co.uk/2010/10/22/proximitypayments/  Used by ISIS (mobile payment system from telcos/banks)  Attempt by carriers to regain control lost from app stores. 46  Chip inside most android phones today.  Typically part of the NFC controller  Same technology as SIM cards.  Used by Google Wallet. More info at: http://nelenkov.blogspot.com/2012/08/accessingembeddedsecureelementin.html 47  We’ve made it easy to get started.  Few hardware requirements (20).  See us for SIM cards (EFF donation) http://simhacks.github.io/  These slides.  Much more technical details.  JavaCard makefiles.  Scripts for managing applets.  Patched Android emulator/system image.  Much more 48 Please contact us with any questions.  Karl Koscher – supersat  Eric Butler – codebutler 49
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